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Han Fei, the pre-Qin Legalist philosopher, has often been accused of advocating a 
complete break between law and morality in a bid to secure absolute power for the ruler. 
This thesis is an attempt to consider anew the relationship between law and morality in 
the Han Fei Zi, and to show that, contrary to what most scholars claim, Han Fei does not 
espouse “government for the ruler.” I argue that the Han Fei Zi was not meant as an 
apology for despotism, but instead, as an antidote to the critical disorder that plagued the 
Warring States period. As such, it must be read for its valuable insights into the perennial 
debate on good government: what it is and how it can be achieved.  
 The first two chapters focus on defending Han Fei against the charge that he is a 
defender of despots. In the first chapter, I explore the Daoist influence on Han Fei to 
understand how and why he appropriates Daoist metaphysics. I begin this chapter by 
trying to prove that Han Fei is a genuine Daoist, that his fa is derived from the Dao and 
therefore also constrained by it. If such a case can be made, then Han Fei cannot be said 
to give the ruler inordinate powers to create the law according to his whim and fancy. By 
the end of the chapter, however, I conclude that it is impossible to determine whether or 
not Han Fei is a genuine adherent of the Dao. An equally reasonable case can be made 
that he is merely using the Dao as a convenient rubber stamp for his severe Legalist 
programme. A different approach is thus needed to challenge the standard account of Han 
Fei as an apologist for tyranny. 
 In the second chapter, I argue that the standard account of Han Fei is flawed 
because in spite of his vitriol against the Confucians, Han Fei shares their fundamental 
belief that government is to li min (benefit the people). I consider those portions of the 
 iv
Han Fei Zi that critics typically use to justify their Machiavellian reading of Han Fei and 
show that these passages are, in fact, perfectly compatible with Han Fei’s commitment to 
li min. So although Han Fei renounces the conventional morality of the Confucians, there 
is an implicit morality in his political system, which is his overarching ‘moral’ goal to 
benefit the people. 
After the standard account of Han Fei as a defender of despots has been 
discredited, I turn, in the third and final chapter, to give an account of why Han Fei 
believed that his was the best government for a critical age. There, I present Han Fei’s 
blueprint for the perfect state, and show how it addresses the flaws inherent in the 





 The traditional scholarship portrays the advent of Legalism as a shameful episode 
in the annals of Chinese thought. The 法家 or Legalist school comprises several thinkers 
classified together retrospectively by the Han doxographers because of their common 
emphasis on government by fa (法: laws or standards). Many scholars see the Legalists 
as advocates of a complete break between law and morality, and therefore regard them as 
China’s answer to Machiavelli.1 Rubin Vitaly goes even further, arguing that the 
“[Legalist] concept of law, devoid of all moral and religious sanctions, is unique in world 
history.”2 The Legalists are accused of promulgating a ruler-centred theory of 
government that views the people as mere tools in the hands of a despot, valuable only 
insofar as they serve the latter’s interests. This is certainly Vandermeersch’s point when 
he writes, “Not realising that the public good or the fatherland can be such a goal [i.e. a 
state goal], the Legalists continued to centre the state around the prince.”3 Needham, too, 
in his influential work, “Science and Civilisation in China,” begins his section on the Fa 
Chia (Legalists) with the following comment: 
If the student of the history of Chinese thought is often tempted to become impatient with 
Confucian sententiousness, he has only to read the writings of the Legalists to come back 
to Confucianism with open arms, and to realise something of that profound humanitarian 
                                                 
1 Too many scholars have made this comparison between Han Fei and Machiavelli. See, for example, 
Robert T. Rowe’s article, “Han Fei Tzu and Niccolo Machiavelli,” in Chinese Culture, vol. XXIII, no. 3, 
September 1982. 
2 Vitaly A. Rubin, Individual and State in Ancient China – essays on four Chinese philosophers, trans. 
Steven I. Levine, Columbia University Press, New York, 1976, p. 66. 
3 Leon Vandermeersch, La formation du legisme, Paris: Ecole francaise d’extreme orient, 1965, p. 192. 
Quoted by Rubin, ibid., p. 70. 
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resistance to tyranny which forms the background of the sacrificial liturgy of the Wên 
Miao.4
Han Fei, the chief proponent and synthesiser of the Legalist school, has also been 
read in this same vein. Kung-Chuan Hsiao, in “A History of Chinese Political Thought,” 
writes this about Han Fei: 
[The] Confucians held the people to be the objective of politics, and regarded ethics as 
the standard of life... Han Fei Tzu’s elevation of the ruler was wholly different from 
that... Thus the ruler in his own person became the objective of politics, and its sole 
standard... [This] governing by power became the most logical theory for monarchic 
despotism. The Confucians merged ethics and politics into one in their discourses, 
retaining some of the colouring of ancient thought. As Han Fei Tzu discussed power, he 
set ethics completely outside the realm of politics, and established a wholly political kind 
of thought, having thereby a modern flavour.5
This thesis is an attempt to consider anew the relationship between law and morality in 
the Han Fei Zi (韩非子), and to show that, contrary to what most scholars claim, Han Fei 
does not espouse “government for the ruler.” I will argue that the Han Fei Zi was not 
intended as an apology for despotism, but instead, as an antidote to the disorder that 
plagued the Warring States period. As such, this thesis will consider the Han Fei Zi for its 
contribution to the perennial debate on good government: what it is and how it can be 
achieved.  
 In the first chapter, I will explore the Daoist influence on Han Fei and consider 
how and why he appropriates Daoist metaphysics. The underlying assumption in this 
                                                 
4 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 204. 
5 Kung-chuan Hsiao, A History of Chinese Political Thought, vol. 1, trans. F. W. Mote, Princeton 
University Press, 1979, pp. 385-386. 
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chapter is that if Han Fei’s fa were somehow based upon the Dao (道), then Legalist law, 
far from being subject to the whim and fancy of a tyrannical despot, would in fact be 
constrained by and reflective of the normative Dao. 
 In the second chapter, I will argue that in spite of his vitriol against the 
Confucians, Han Fei shares their fundamental belief that government is to li min (利民: 
benefit the people). To make this argument, I will consider those portions of the Han Fei 
Zi that critics typically use to justify their Machiavellian reading of Han Fei and show 
that these passages are, in fact, perfectly compatible with Han Fei’s commitment to li 
min. 
After debunking the traditional account of Han Fei as a defender of despots, I will 
attempt, in the third and final chapter, to excavate from his writings insights into the 
debate on good government. I will present Han Fei’s blueprint for the perfect state, and 
show how it addresses the flaws inherent in the Confucian system. I will then conclude 
by assessing the viability of Han Fei’s proposal for good government. 
 3
Chapter One: The Daoist influence on Han Fei 
 Han Fei is best known as a practical-minded political philosopher who wastes no 
time in metaphysical musings. In “The Five Vermin (五蠹),” for example, when Han Fei 
criticises people “whose words are subtle and mysterious (微妙之言),”1 he is presumably 
targeting those people who were engaged in abstract metaphysical discussions. On the 
other hand, the term “Daoist” has been applied retrospectively by the Han doxographers 
to those thinkers who enquired into the origin and ultimate nature of all things, or the 
Dao. At first glance then, it seems unlikely that Han Fei would have anything to do with 
Daoism. The Han historian Sima Qian, however, postulates precisely such a relationship 
between these two unlikely bedfellows. He remarks in the “Lao-tzu Han-fei lieh-chuan:”2
Han Fei deliberated on affairs according to inked-string [objective standards] thereby 
making clear what is right and what is wrong; he was extremely severe and lacking in 
humanheartedness. He drew his principles from Taoist canons but Lao Tzu was by far the 
more profound.3 (Italics mine)  
 Indeed, there are five chapters in the Han Fei Zi that either deal directly with or 
draw significantly from the Dao De Jing or the Lao Zi. These are, “Commentaries on Lao 
Tzu’s teachings (解老)”, “Illustrations of Lao Tzu’s Teachings (喻老)”, “Wielding the 
Sceptre (扬榷)”, “The Tao of the Sovereign (主道)”, and “The Principal Features of 
                                                 
1 Burton Watson’s translation in Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings, Columbia University Press, 1964, p. 108.  
2 The pinyin method of romanization is used throughout this thesis. However, the spelling used in the 
secondary works cited has been preserved, and so have some of the names. 
3 Ssu-ma Ch’ien, Shih Chi, IV, Taipei: Ming-lun ch’u-pan she, 1972, p. 2156. Translated by Wang Hsiao-
Po and Leo S. Chang, and quoted in The Philosophical Foundations of Han Fei’s Political Theory, 
University of Hawaii Press, Monograph no. 7 of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, 1986, 
p. 94. 
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Legalism (大体).”4 Many critics have dismissed these chapters as inauthentic on the basis 
that they are isolated chapters and are largely inconsistent with Han Fei’s thought 
system.5 However, I think that such a criticism does not take into proper account Sima 
Qian’s record in the Shi Ji (史记: Historical Records). If we start from the assumption 
that his record is reliable, that Han Fei did in fact “[draw] his principles from Taoist 
canons,” we could reach the equally reasonable conclusion offered by Wang and Chang, 
that what Han Fei does in these five chapters is to provide a “philosophically coherent 
framework” or “theoretical basis”6 for his governing techniques, which are elaborated in 
the rest of the Han Fei Zi.  
In the same chapter of the Shi Ji, Sima Qian also describes Han Fei as having 
based his principles on Huang and Lao.7 According to Wang and Chang, this raises two 
possibilities for a consideration of Han Fei’s relationship to Daoism. From the statement 
that Han Fei based his teachings on Huang and Lao, one could conclude that he drew on 
“a unique system of thought,” one that combined the teachings of the Yellow Emperor 
and Lao Zi in a “complex and coherent” way.8 For Wang and Chang, however, there is 
insufficient evidence to argue for the existence of such an integrated thought system 
during Han Fei’s time. They therefore opt for the second possibility, that Han Fei was 
tapping on two distinct but related patterns of thought, which are recorded in the Huang 
                                                 
4 These are W. K. Liao’s translation of the Chinese titles. See Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzǔ, 
Arthur Probsthain, 1939. 
5 For a more detailed discussion of the authenticity question, look at Wang Hsiao-Po and Leo S. Chang’s 
appendix to The Philosophical Foundations, op. cit., pp. 87-109. 
6 Ibid., p. 106. 
7 Ssu-ma Ch’ien, “Lao-tzu Han Fei lieh-chuan,” Shih Chih, IV, op. cit., p. 2146. Ssu-ma Ch’ien wrote: 
“Han Fei ... delighted in the study of punishments (and) names, law and methods of government, while 
basing (his principles) upon Huang and Lao.” Translated by Wang and Chang and quoted in The 
Philosophical Foundations, op. cit., p. 87. 
8 Ibid., p. 87. 
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Di Jing and the Dao De Jing respectively. Tradition recognises the Yellow Emperor as 
the author of the former, and Lao Zi, as the latter’s author.9  
 There is little to be said about just how much and what exactly Han Fei borrows 
from the Huang Di Jing, since he only quotes once from it explicitly10 and, furthermore, 
this quotation cannot be traced to any of the extant texts. Wang and Chang only go so far 
as to say that there is a striking parallel between the content of the Huang Di Si Jing and 
Han Fei’s thought-system.11 A lot more can be said about the relationship between Han 
Fei’s political philosophy and Lao Zi’s Daoism, and it is to an examination of this that we 
now turn. 
 On the face of it, Han Fei’s Legalist techniques seem to be completely at variance 
with Lao Zi’s Daoism. While Lao Zi espouses small government and minimal 
government intervention, Han Fei argues for a strong, centralised bureaucracy that 
extends its control over every aspect of the people’s lives. Again, Lao Zi argues that the 
ruler should not advance men of worth so that the people will not contend, whereas Han 
Fei makes the contrary case that one of the very reasons for the prevailing disorder of his 
day is that rulers have not exalted the worthy. It is also unthinkable that Lao Zi would 
endorse the severe penalties meted out by Han Fei’s ruler.  
                                                 
9 So as not to digress from the main point of this chapter, I will circumvent the thorny issues surrounding 
the authorship of both works. Just as a quick note, only fragments of the Huang Di Jing remain although a 
prima facie case can be made that the four separate chapters preceding the volume of the Lao Zi text 
discovered in a Han tomb at Ma Wang Dui in 1973-4 correspond to those chapters of the Huang Di Si Jing 
mentioned in “Yi Wen Zhi” of the History of the Former Han Dynasty or Qian Han Shu. For an insight into 
the debate on the authorship of the Dao De Jing, refer to Alan K. L. Chan’s “The Daodejing and Its 
Tradition” in Daoism Handbook, ed. Livia Kohn, Köln: Brill, 2000, pp. 4-6.  
10 Han Fei quotes the Yellow Emperor in “Wielding the Sceptre.” See Liao’s The Complete Works, vol. 1, 
op. cit., p. 59. The quotation reads, “The Yellow Emperor made the saying: ‘Superior and inferior wage one 
hundred battles a day.’....” 
11 Wang and Chang, The Philosophical Foundations, op. cit., pp. 90-93. For an in-depth study of the Huang 
Di Si Jing and its similarities and differences with the Han Fei Zi, read R. P. Peerenboom’s Law and 
Morality in Ancient China, State University of New York Press, 1993. 
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 In the light of all these striking dissimilarities, several intriguing questions are 
raised. First, in what sense or how did Han Fei “draw upon Taoist canons”? A related 
albeit more speculative question is, given his practical bent and his contempt for abstruse 
thinking, why did Han Fei even borrow the Daoist metaphysical framework? Was he 
genuinely interested in discovering and following the Dao, or was he, in typical 
Machiavellian fashion, merely making use of the Dao as a convenient rubber stamp for 
his harsh Legalist regime? We will attempt to answer these questions by making the 
following preliminary assumption: If it can be shown that Han Fei’s fa is somehow based 
upon and thereby constrained by the Dao, that his laws are not simply made at the ruler’s 
whim, then we would have succeeded in debunking the traditional account of Han Fei as 
a defender of despots.  
1.1 Natural law theorist or legal positivist? 
  Western scholars on the Han Fei Zi have generally cashed out the debate in terms 
of the familiar distinction in the West between natural law and legal positivism.12 
Peerenboom represents one camp within the scholarship, which insists on reading Han 
Fei as a legal positivist, whilst Wang and Chang represent the other camp, which sees 
him as some kind of a natural law theorist.  
 
                                                 
12 K. K. Lee, for example, wrote an article titled: “The Legalist School and Legal Positivism,” published in 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3, 1975, pp. 23-56. As the title suggests, Lee draws a connection between 
the Chinese Legalists and the legal theory of legal positivism. Needham, too, appears to take it for granted 
that the Legalists were legal positivists. He writes, “The central conception of fa, or positive law, enacted 
by the lawgiving prince without regard to considerations of accepted morality or the goodwill of the people, 
appears everywhere in Shang Yang and Han Fei Tzu [p. 206].” And again, “The Legalists were conscious 
of this conflict between theoretically constructed positive law on the one hand, and ethics and equity, and 
even what one might call human common sense, on the other [p. 207].” Needham also argues that with the 
“steady replacement of Legalist by Confucian ideals ... natural law came to be overwhelmingly dominant in 
China, and positive law reduced to the minimum [p. 214].” Joseph Needham, “The Fa Chia (Legalists),” in 
Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1991.  
 7
1.1.1 Some definitions 
In the history of Western jurisprudence, John Austin and H. L. A. Hart stand out 
as two of the more prominent legal positivists. Austin argued that laws are the general 
orders of the sovereign backed by threat of sanction.13 Austin’s command theory of law 
thus makes the ultimate authority of the sovereign the yardstick of legal positivism. 
Hart’s minimum separation thesis, on the other hand, labels as “positivist” those theories 
that deny that there need be any necessary connection between law and morality.14 
Peerenboom measures Han Fei against both of these accepted standards of legal 
positivism and concludes that he is a legal positivist. As Peerenboom reads it, Han Fei 
not only establishes the ruler as the ultimate authority over the law15, he also “shares 
[Hart’s] belief that morality and the law need not coincide.”16
 Natural law theory is commonly perceived as the antithesis to legal positivism. 
Like legal positivism, the natural law tradition is extremely heterogeneous and defies any 
simple definition. Acknowledging the risk of oversimplification, Peerenboom proceeds to 
identify some key features of natural law theory.17 One of its fundamental tenets is that 
there is a necessary relation between law and morality. Natural law proponents on the 
whole reject the legal positivist’s notion that “what pleases the prince has the force of 
law.”18 They reject the idea that something has the force of law simply in virtue of its 
being issued by a sovereign. There needs to be an ethical or rational reason underlying 
                                                 
13 John Austin, “Positivist Conception of Law”, in Philosophy of Law, ed. Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross, 
Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1980. 
14 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961. 
15 Peerenboom, Law and Morality, op. cit., p. 142.  
16 Ibid., p. 143. 
17 Ibid., see section 2.1, “Philosophy of Law: A Hermeneutical Framework”, pp. 20-26.  
18 Ibid., p. 20. In his footnote, Peerenboom refers the reader to John Austin’s command theory put forth in 
The Providence of Jurisprudence Determined. I think he probably meant Austin’s The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined.  
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our laws and our obligation to obey the law, they argue. According to Peerenboom, 
however, the mere insistence that the law reflects ethical considerations is not sufficient 
to make a natural law argument “in the strict sense.”19 He wants instead to clarify the 
“foundational nature” of natural law arguments, and by this, he means that natural law “is 
often grounded in some ultimate source of value that is beyond further questioning.”20 
Examples of such ultimate sources of value are divine law, the laws of nature and 
fundamental ethical principles. It is on these criteria, then, that Peerenboom believes 
Wang and Chang label Han Fei a natural law proponent.21  
 It is intriguing how one text has spawned two diametrically opposite 
interpretations. I suggest that the best way to understand both of these positions is to 
juxtapose them, and have them respond to each other, as in a debate. I will attempt to do 
this in the following section.  
1.1.2 The positivist reading of Han Fei and a natural law critique 
 
 As I have earlier intimated, one of the reasons why critics have by and large 
favoured the positivist reading of Han Fei is because the so-called “Daoist elements” are 
perceived to be confined to just a few chapters in the Han Fei Zi. Peerenboom, for 
example, while acknowledging that the aforementioned five ‘Daoist chapters’ “may 
represent Han Fei’s sincere effort to adopt Daoism and Huang-Lao thought as the 
cosmological basis on which to erect his Legalist political edifice,” contends that Han Fei 
is at best only “partially successful” for he “never fills in the rough outline sketched in 
these few chapters.”22
                                                 
19 Peerenboom, Law and Morality, op. cit., p. 22.  
20 Ibid., p. 21. 
21 Ibid., see the chapter, “The Pragmatic Statesmanship of Han Fei”, pp. 139-170. 
22 Ibid., p. 146. 
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Wang and Chang dispute this claim and argue instead that, “in the Han Fei-tzu, 
the Tao-te ching views are more pervasive and more widely interspersed than is generally 
believed.”23 They see the five Daoist chapters as setting the theoretical ground for the rest 
of Han Fei’s political programme, which is spelt out in the remaining chapters of the Han 
Fei Zi. An example they cite is from “Illustrations of Lao Tzu’s Teachings,” where Han 
Fei comments on Chapter Thirty-Six of the Lao Zi, in particular the sayings: “The fish 
should not escape from the deep,” and the “state’s sharp tools [should] not be shown to 
anybody.”24 Han Fei elaborates on these sayings in “Inner Congeries of Sayings, The 
Lower Series: Six Minutiae (内储说下六微),” which is not one of the five famed Daoist 
chapters, and is, furthermore, judged to be authentic by Sima Qian, who specifically 
mentions it in his Shi Ji25: “High authority is the pool of the lord of men. Ministers are 
the fish swimming in high authority ... The weapons of the state should not be shown to 
anybody.”26 Wang and Chang argue that Han Fei adopts Lao Zi’s “dialectical logic,” 
which he expounds in the Daoist chapters, to moor his Legalist shu (术: statecraft)27. The 
“lord of men” must lie low in order to control from above. He must not “show”, or rather, 
share his weapons, which are his instruments of reward and punishment, with his 
ministers, or he will end up being controlled by them.28 Wang and Chang’s view is 
corroborated by Zhang Jue, who writes that of the fifty-five chapters in the Han Fei Zi, at 
least nineteen contain either a direct quotation from the Lao Zi or an exposition of Lao 
                                                 
23 Wang and Chang, The Philosophical Foundations, op. cit., p. 106. 
24 Liao, vol. 1, pp. 210-212. 
25 “Lao-tzu Han-fei lieh-chuan”, Shih-chi, IV, op. cit., p. 2147.  
26 Liao, vol. 2, pp. 5-6. 
27 This is Fu Zhengyuan’s translation of shu. See China’s Legalists: The Earliest Totalitarians and Their 
Art of Ruling, M. E. Sharpe, 1996. 
28 Wang and Chang, The Philosophical Foundations, op. cit., p. 106. 
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Zi’s Daoism.29 Much more can and must be said to substantiate Wang and Chang’s 
thesis, but we will leave this for another section, where we attempt a natural law 
reconstruction of the Han Fei Zi. 
 Another reason that lends weight to the positivist reading of Han Fei is his 
apparent condemnation of Daoism as a “useless” and “lawless” creed. Liao believes that 
Han Fei is targeting Daoists when he writes in “Loyalty and Filial Piety: a Memorial 
(忠孝),” “Thy servant, however, thinks the philosophy of peace and quietude (恬淡之学) 
is a useless creed and the doctrine of vagueness and illusion (恍惚之言) is a lawless 
creed.”30 According to Liao, the former is a reference to Chapter Thirty-One of the Lao 
Zi, “Quelling War,” while the latter is a reference to Chapter Twenty-One of the Lao Zi, 
where the Dao is described as “恍惚.”31 If Daoists are indeed his intended target of abuse 
in chapters such as “The Five Vermin” and “Loyalty and Filial Piety,” then a more 
probable case can be made that Han Fei is, elsewhere, merely using Daoist terminology 
to justify his severe Legalist programme. However, according to Wang and Chang, the 
reason why Han Fei is seen at times lauding Daoism, and at other times, renouncing it, is 
because he is speaking to different audiences. They write: 
Han Fei, then, like other pre-Chin thinkers, differentiated the genre of knowledge 
appropriate for the ruler from the one considered fitting for the ruled. Thus, abstract 
philosophical thoughts, “wonderfully mysterious” and “transcendentally abstruse,” were 
considered not only comprehensible but also appropriate for an effective government by 
the ruler.32  
                                                 
29 See Zhang Jue’s (张觉) foreword to his 韩非子全译 (上), 贵州人民出版社, 1990, pp. 12-13. 
30 Liao, vol. 2, p. 315. 
31 Ibid. See Liao’s footnotes 2 and 3.  
32 Wang and Chang, The Philosophical Foundations, op. cit., p. 101. 
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So when Han Fei criticises what appears to be Daoist-types who engage in metaphysical 
speculation, he is in fact chastising the common man who has no access to the mysterious 
workings of the Dao.  
 Someone might object to Wang and Chang’s above explanation because it 
suggests that Han Fei’s scheme requires a Daoist sage-ruler who, alone among the 
people, is capable of apprehending the Dao and ruling in accordance with it. This seems 
to go against the general idea in the Han Fei Zi that “government is for the average 
person by the average ruler.”33 Han Fei does exhort the ruler time and again to depend 
solely on the law, so that the empire is not held ransom to the rare appearance of a 
Confucian sage-king before order can be achieved. In “The Way to Maintain the State 
(守道),” for example, Han Fei remarks, “Therefore to construct a cage is not to provide 
against rats but to enable the weak and timid to subdue the tiger; to establish laws is not 
to provide against Tsêng Ts‘an and Shih Ch‘iu but to enable the average sovereign to 
prohibit Robber Chê.”34 Nevertheless, I believe that we can meet the above objection if 
we imagine Han Fei to be that Daoist sage who teaches the mediocre rulers of his age the 
Way of government. However, because he is petitioning these rulers to heed his 
proposals, he appeals to them rhetorically to use their “privileged access to the Dao” to 
authenticate and implement his ruling methods.  
Such a reading is, I think, justified if we consider two similar chapters in the Han 
Fei Zi where Han Fei laments the ineptitude of the rulers of his day, who would rather 
listen to the state-ruining proposals of their fawning cronies than heed his state-saving 
advice. In “Solitary Indignation (孤愤)” and “The Difficulty of Pien Ho (和氏),” Han Fei 
                                                 
33 Peerenboom, Law and Morality, op. cit., p. 141. 
34 Liao, vol. 1 p. 268. 
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bemoans the isolation and bitter fate of the “upholders of law and tact,” who are 
marginalised at court because they “have neither the relationship of the trusted and 
beloved nor the favour of the long acquaintances and old intimates, and, what is still 
worse, intend to reform the biased mind of the lord of men with lectures on law and tact; 
which altogether is opposed to the taste of the lord of men.”35 Like Pien Ho, whose gift of 
an uncut jade was wrongly regarded by the ruler as an ordinary stone, and who 
subsequently even had his left foot cut off for lying, these “upholders of law and tact” too 
are looked over, even censured and punished, because foolish rulers are blind to their 
wisdom. From these two chapters, then, we get the sense that Han Fei is that lone Daoist 
sage who grasps the Dao of government and spells this out in no uncertain terms to the 
befuddled rulers of his age, whom he nonetheless appeals to as “enlightened rulers”36 in 
order to persuade them to act on his proposals. 
Zhang Jue explains away the apparent inconsistencies in the Han Fei Zi by using 
a different tack. While Wang and Chang accept that Han Fei’s diatribes against abstruse, 
metaphysical thinking is possibly targeted at Daoists, or at least those Daoists among the 
common people, Zhang insists that in these passages, Han Fei is really attacking a 
different group of people. In “The Five Vermin,” for example, some have read Han Fei’s 
criticism of those people “whose words are subtle and mysterious”37, as a criticism of 
Daoists. Zhang, however, believes that Han Fei is in fact repudiating the Confucians and 
proponents of the Horizontal and Vertical Alliance (纵横家), who confuse the law with 
their eloquence and persuasions.38 Again, in “Loyalty and Filial Piety,” Zhang avers that 
                                                 
35 “Solitary Indignation,” Liao, vol. 1, p. 99. 
36 See, for example, “Wielding Power.” Watson’s translation, p. 37.  
37 Watson, p. 108. 
38 张觉, 韩非子全译 (上), op. cit., 前言p. 13. 
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the main brunt of Han Fei’s vitriol here should be borne by the Confucians, the 
proponents of the Horizontal and Vertical Alliance, and the so-called “heroes of 
antiquity,”39 whose “philosophy of peace and quietude” and “doctrine of vagueness and 
illusion” disturb the public standards of the ruler.40 Zhang’s explanation, however, does 
not seem to me to be a very good one because without any evidence to prove that these 
groups were propagating such teachings, it is hard to imagine the Confucians, in 
particular, spewing “subtle and mysterious” doctrines.  
Peerenboom provides one of the more thoroughgoing accounts of Han Fei as a 
legal positivist, and it is his account that we will now focus our discussion on. As we saw 
earlier, Peerenboom labels Han Fei a legal positivist on the basis that he satisfies Austin 
and Hart’s positivist theories. Austin, we remember, says that laws are the general 
commands of a sovereign backed by threat of sanction. The implication of his sovereign 
command theory is, as Hart points out, that there could be no legal limitations to the 
sovereign’s power. As Peerenboom puts it, “By definition, he [the ruler] need answer to 
none ... In the final word, law is what the ruler says it is; it is what pleases the ruler.”41 He 
then argues that Han Fei similarly “confers on the ruler ultimate authority to determine 
what the laws will be, how they ought to be applied, and whether or not they should be 
changed.”42 He cites this passage from the Han Fei Zi to substantiate his point: 
As laws are the means to forbid extra-judicial action and exterminate selfish motives and 
severe penalties the means to execute decrees and censure inferiors, legal authority 
                                                 
39 Liao, vol. 2, p. 314. 
40 张觉, 韩非子全译 (上), op. cit., 前言p. 13. 
41 Peerenboom, Law and Morality, op. cit., pp. 142-143. 
42 Ibid., p. 143. 
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should not be delegated to anybody and legal control should not be open to common use. 
Should legal authority and control be held in common, all manners of abuse will appear.43
Fu Zhengyuan, too, portrays Han Fei and the Legalists in very much the same way as 
Peerenboom. He writes, “For the Legalists, law is simply the command of the ruler, 
which publicly represents his preference and volition. The ruler alone is distinguished 
from other mortals by his absolute authority to issue decrees that become law. The ruler 
is the sole source and creator of the law.”44 Herein lies one of the main differences that 
Peerenboom notes between Han Fei’s ruler and the Huang-Lao ruler of the Boshu.45 Han 
Fei’s ruler is the ultimate authority for the law, and is therefore effectively beyond its 
reach. In contrast, the Huang-Lao ruler does not create laws according to his whim and 
fancies. In the Boshu, it is the Way that generates the laws.46 Consequently, even the ruler 
is not above the law and must abide by it.47 To summarise what has been said so far, what 
emerges from Peerenboom’s account of the Han Fei Zi is the image of an immensely 
powerful ruler whose word, literally, is the law, and who, as the creator or the source of 
the law, is unconstrained by it. It is easy to see how such an account lends itself to the 
widespread interpretation of Han Fei as a defender of despots, although Peerenboom 
himself argues for a more charitable view of Han Fei.48
In his account, Peerenboom also considers and rejects Wang and Chang’s natural 
law reading of the Han Fei Zi, which he summarises as follows: 
                                                 
43 Han Fei, “Having Regulations (有度),” Liao, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 44. 
44 Fu, China’s Legalists, op. cit., p. 60. 
45 This refers to what has come to be known as the Huang-Lao Boshu or the Silk Manuscripts of Huang-
Lao, which were discovered in a tomb at Mawangdui in 1973. 
46 Peerenboom, Law and Morality, op. cit., p. 62. 
47 Ibid., p. 78. 
48 Ibid., pp. 154-170. 
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[Wang and Chang] claim that, like Huang-Lao, Han Fei synthesizes Daoism and 
Legalism by basing fa (law) on dao; advances a holistic naturalism; and sponsors an 
epistemology in which one empties oneself of bias by becoming empty and tranquil (xu 
jing) so that one then objectively discovers the Way, understands the relationship 
between names and reality, and knows how to wu wei.49
He rejects such a reading because he believes that “Han Fei differs significantly from the 
author of the Boshu on issues ranging from philosophy of language to epistemology, 
indicating that he is a legal positivist and not a natural law theorist.”50  
On all of these issues, Peerenboom’s main argument against a natural law reading 
seems to be his observation that Han Fei is a “tough-minded pragmatist”51 whose “spirit 
of down-to-earth practicality infuses and is manifest in every area of Han Fei’s thought, 
be it politics, epistemology, jurisprudence, or aesthetics.”52 Han Fei does berate the 
artisan who took three years to paint intricate designs on the Ruler of Chou’s whip 
because, to him, utility is what matters.53 He is renowned for his scathing criticisms of 
Confucian scholars and their like for neglecting to till the land and fight. He also minces 
no words in condemning the Dialecticians (名家) for their sophistry and word games.54 
Furthermore, he rejects the ancients’ prescriptions for order because they do not match 
the political realities of his day. However, we can admit all these and still not reach 
Peerenboom’s conclusion that “Han Fei is a pragmatist rather than a Huang-Lao 
foundationalist,” who, “unlike the author of the Boshu, does not look to a transcendent, 
                                                 
49 Peerenboom, Law and Morality, op. cit., p. 140. 
50 Ibid., pp. 146-147. 
51 Peerenboom uses the term ‘pragmatist’ loosely to denote a ‘practical-minded’ person. He is not using it 
in the philosophy of law sense to denote the particular school of legal pragmatism. 
52 Ibid., p. 147. 
53 Han Fei, “Outer Congeries of Sayings, Upper Left Series (外储说左上),” Liao, vol. 2., pp. 39-40. 
54 See for example “Outer Congeries of Sayings, Upper Left Series,” Liao, vol. 2, p. 37, where Han Fei 
criticises the Dialectician Ni Yüeh.  
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normatively predetermined natural order as the standard for political order.”55 I think the 
problem with Peerenboom’s argument is that he takes it for granted that a practical 
attitude or a concern with the practical goals of government is somehow incompatible 
with “Huang-Lao foundationalism” or natural law theory. I suggest, however, that it is 
not unreasonable to make the opposite case, that it is precisely because Han Fei is a 
“pragmatist” that he looks to the Dao for the uniquely efficient path of government, one 
that best promotes the interests of the people. Consider Han Fei’s words at the beginning 
of “The Principal Features of Legalism:” 
The ancients who completed the principal features of legalism, looked upon heaven and 
earth, surveyed rivers and oceans, and followed mountains and ravines; wherefore they 
ruled as the sun and the moon shine, worked as the four seasons rotate, and benefited the 
world in the way clouds spread and winds move.56
The “ancients” based the principal features of legalism on the Dao and consequently 
found “the myriad things well provided [for]” and “the country rich.”57 Contrary to what 
Peerenboom believes then, it is entirely conceivable that Han Fei is both a practical man 
and a natural law theorist. 
 To justify this criticism of Peerenboom, let us examine two issues on which he 
judges Han Fei to be a legal positivist. First, Peerenboom concludes that Han Fei is a 
legal positivist based on the latter’s philosophy of language. He compares Han Fei with 
the author of the Boshu, who “sponsors a semantic or realist correspondence theory of 
language where names pick out objects and reflect distinctions that exist in objective 
                                                 
55 Peerenboom, Law and Morality, op. cit., p. 148. 
56 Liao, vol. 1, p. 278. 
57 Liao, vol. 1, p. 280. 
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reality.”58 In contrast, Han Fei’s theory of xing ming (刑名) is “more of a technique for 
political control than a theory of correspondence between word and a predetermined 
natural order:”59 This indeed seems to be the thrust of the following passage. Han Fei 
begins by describing the enlightened ruler who empties himself of personal bias in order 
to discern objective reality as it is, replete with names and their proper forms, and ensure 
that in the empire, names match forms: 
The Way is the beginning of all things and the measure of right and wrong. Therefore the 
enlightened ruler holds fast to the beginning in order to understand the wellspring of all 
beings, and minds the measure in order to know the source of good and bad. He waits, 
empty and still, letting names define themselves and affairs reach their own settlement. 
Being empty, he can comprehend the true aspect of fullness; being still, he can correct the 
mover.60
However, he immediately goes on to spell out how the ruler can control his ministers: 
Those whose duty it is to speak will come forward to name (ming) themselves; those 
whose duty it is to act will produce results (xing). When names and results (xing ming) 
match, the ruler need do nothing more and the true aspect of all things will be revealed. 
This only confirms Peerenboom’s suspicions that Han Fei’s theory of xing ming is but 
“one pragmatic art of rulership in the Legalist ruler’s bag of tricks.”61 In Han Fei’s 
scheme, it is not the Dao, but the ministers themselves who generate names; they name 
their proposals before the ruler, who need only ensure that forms, or their performances, 
match their words. Peerenboom points out that even Wang and Chang admit that Han 
Fei’s theory of xing ming is a “practical, political one: ‘Han Fei’s discrimination between 
                                                 
58 Peerenboom, Law and Morality, op. cit., p. 148. 
59 Ibid., pp. 148-149. 
60 Han Fei, “The Way of the Ruler,” Watson, p. 16. 
61 Peerenboom, Law and Morality, op. cit., p. 150. 
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what is apparent and what is intrinsically real is not epistemological in nature; rather, ... 
[it] has everything to do with the reality of effective performance’.”62  
 Peerenboom rehashes exactly the same argument on the issue of epistemology. He 
argues that in Han Fei’s hands, the key elements of Huang-Lao epistemology: xu jing 
(虚静), wu si (无思), and wu wei (无为), have become mere political tools to protect the 
ruler.63  
As I said earlier, I think Peerenboom’s argument fails because he argues for Han 
Fei as a legal positivist on the untenable premise that one cannot have “practical and 
political interests” and at the same time be a natural law theorist. To put this loosely, 
Peerenboom seems to be saying that just because Han Fei is not interested in the Dao for 
its own sake, he cannot be a genuine Daoist. This conceptual error, unfortunately, 
abounds in the secondary literature on the Han Fei Zi.64 Just to cite another example, 
Robert Rowe writes, “[Han Fei] had no interest or concern with ‘sin’ or virtue or 
morality. That is what puts him at odds with orthodox Confucianists. He was a ‘practical’ 
man trying to solve ‘practical’ problems in a difficult time.”65 Rowe seems to suggest that 
being a “practical man” somehow precludes Han Fei from being concerned with 
morality. Scholars from Peerenboom to Rowe thus argue, fallaciously, that since Han Fei 
is undeniably a practical man with mainly political interests, he cannot be a natural law 
theorist and, also, he must be uninterested in morality. Such conceptual confusion is, I 
                                                 
62 Wang and Chang, The Philosophical Foundations, pp. 70-71. Quoted by Peerenboom, ibid., p. 149.  
63  I will reserve the explanation of these terms for section 1.1.3.  
64 This conceptual confusion is especially a problem amongst Western scholars of the Han Fei Zi. Their 
Chinese counterparts are concerned with wholly different issues in the text.  
65 Robert T. Rowe, “Han Fei Tzu and Niccolo Machiavelli,” in Chinese Culture, vol. XXIII, no. 3, 
September 1982, p. 35. 
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suspect, the reason why the traditional account of Han Fei as an apologist for tyranny has 
been accepted as orthodoxy.  
Wang and Chang, who argue for Han Fei as a natural law theorist, clearly do not 
see any difficulty in suggesting, as seen in the earlier quote, that Han Fei is “reality-
oriented” and “very much performance-oriented.”66 To understand why, it might be 
helpful to think about what Creel says with regard to Daoism. Creel does not see any 
dichotomy between what he terms the “contemplative” and “purposive” aspects of 
philosophical Daoism. He says that in the Lao Zi, there is a tendency to “treat the tao as a 
method of control, of acquiring power.”67 However, this in no way undermines it as being 
equally a treatise on the Dao. The “purposive” is simply the flip side of the 
“contemplative” aspect in the Lao Zi. Similarly for the Han Fei Zi then, we can read its 
“purposive” aspects or its governing strategies as a direct product of the enlightened 
ruler’s contemplation on the Dao. I will make the full case for this in the following 
section. 
1.1.3  A natural law reconstruction of the Han Fei Zi  
 I have been suggesting throughout this chapter that Han Fei’s political theory is 
based on a Daoistic world-view. In this section, I will give a sketch of Han Fei’s 
understanding of the Dao and suggest how it translates into the three pillars of his 
political philosophy: shi (势: power or position), shu (术: statecraft), and fa (法: laws or 
standards).  
In “Wielding Power,” one of the five acclaimed Daoist chapters, Han Fei writes: 
                                                 
66 Wang and Chang, The Philosophical Foundations, op. cit., p. 78. 
67 Herrlee G. Creel, “What is Taoism?” in What is Taoism? and Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History, 
The University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 5. 
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The Way is vast and great and without form; its Power is clear and orderly and extends 
everywhere. Since it extends to all living beings, they may use it proportionately; but, 
though all things flourish through it, it does not rest among things. The Way pervades all 
affairs here below. Therefore examine and obey the decrees of Heaven and live and die at 
the right times; compare names, differentiate events, comprehend their unity, and identify 
yourself with the Way’s true nature.68
In the above passage, Han Fei describes the Dao as vast and far-reaching. Although it 
pervades and supports all things in the universe, it does not rest among them. He then 
exhorts the ruler to “identify [himself] with the Way’s true nature,” which suggests that 
the ruler ought to embody the characteristics of the Dao; to be similarly vast, great, 
formless, all-pervasive and yet unique from the myriad things. Sure enough, Han Fei 
continues, in the following paragraph, to describe exactly how the ruler ought to put his 
understanding of the Dao into practical use for ruling the empire: 
Thus it is said: The Way does not identify itself with the myriad beings; its Power does 
not identify itself with the yin and yang, any more than a scale identifies itself with 
heaviness or lightness, a plumb line with bumps and hollows, a reed organ with dampness 
or dryness, or a ruler with his ministers. All these [the myriad beings, the yin and yang, 
heaviness and lightness, etc.] are products of the Way; but the Way itself is never plural – 
therefore it is called a unity. For this reason the enlightened ruler prizes solitariness, 
which is the characteristic of the Way. The ruler and his ministers do not follow the same 
way. The ministers name their proposals, the ruler holds fast to the name, and the 
ministers come forward with results. When names and results match, then superior and 
inferior will achieve harmony.69
                                                 
68 Watson, p. 37. Watson writes in footnote 3 that “in Taoist terminology, Heaven is synonymous with the 
Way, or Tao.” 
69 Ibid. 
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I have quoted Han Fei at length because in this passage alone, we get a glimpse of how 
his understanding of the Dao translates into both the shi and shu aspects of his political 
programme.  
First of all, we see Han Fei laying the theoretical basis for his concept of shi. Just 
as the Way is never plural, the enlightened ruler must rule in solitude; he must distinguish 
himself from his ministers, inasmuch as the Way does not identify with the myriad 
beings. This concept of shi is elaborated in other chapters of the Han Fei Zi. In “Outer 
Congeries of Sayings, The Upper Right Series (外储说右上),” for example, Han Fei 
exhorts the ruler to “remove” those ministers who refuse to be transformed by his shi, lest 
they undermine his unique and exalted position of authority.70 Since the ruler cannot 
possibly see to the minutiae of daily governance, he must also make use of his “august 
position (shi)” to get his ministers to do the job. In “Outer Congeries of Sayings, Upper 
Left Series,” Han Fei tells of King Chao of Wey who wanted to have a hand in the 
official routine. After reading “ten and some bamboo slips” of the legal code, however, 
he fell asleep. The lesson for King Chao was: “if a ruler does not hold the august position 
and supreme handles firmly in hand but wants to perform the duties which the ministers 
ought to perform, is it not reasonable that he falls asleep in so doing?”71 Han Fei presses 
the point home by comparing the ruler with the skilled horse-handler, Tsao-fu, in “Outer 
Congeries of Sayings, Lower Right Series (外储说右下).” He writes, “...The State is the 
carriage of the ruler; the august position is his horse. If the Ruler does not know how to 
drive the carriage, then even though he exhausts himself, he cannot avoid chaos. If he 
knows how to drive, he will remain in the place of ease and joy and accomplish the 
                                                 
70 Liao, vol. 2, p. 86. 
71 Liao, vol. 2, p. 57. 
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achievement of the emperor and the king.”72 So central indeed is the concept of shi in 
Han Fei’s political thought that in the chapter “Achievement and Reputation (功名),” he 
argues that shi is more important than the conventional virtue of xian (贤: worthiness) for 
achieving order in the state. Just as a foot of timber at the top of a high mountain 
overlooks the ravine a thousand fathoms below solely in virtue of its high position, so too 
an unworthy ruler like Chieh could rule over All-under-Heaven solely because “his 
position was influential.” Chieh is contrasted with the ancient sage-king Yao, who, while 
a commoner, could not rectify three families. Han Fei’s explanation: “Not that he was 
unworthy, but that his position was low.”73
 The earlier quoted passage from “Wielding Power” also highlights the importance 
of shu or statecraft in the Legalist political edifice. Maintaining his august position alone 
is insufficient for the ruler to govern effectively. Since he must involve the ministers in 
the daily running of the state, he has to employ shu to control them, otherwise, his shi or 
position would be undermined.74 In that passage, Han Fei spells out one of the key 
techniques of political control (shu) that the enlightened ruler must wield – xing ming. 
Han Fei’s theory of xing ming encompasses a cluster of terms that he borrows from the 
Daoists. These include: xu jing (虚静), wu wei (无为), wu yu (无欲) and qu zhi (去智).75
 In “Wielding Power,” one of the ways in which the ruler ought to “identify with 
the Way’s true nature” is to be “empty, still, inactive (xu jing wu wei), for this is the true 
                                                 
72 Liao, vol. 2, pp. 133-134. 
73 Liao, vol. 1, pp. 275-276. 
74 In the “Outer Congeries of Sayings, Lower Right Series,” Han Fei quotes the saying: “If the lord of men 
does not apply tact (shu), his prestige and position (wei shi: 威势) will become insignificant and ministers 
will celebrate themselves at leisure.” Liao, vol. 2, p. 134. 
75 This list is not exhaustive. I have picked out some of the key Daoist terms that Han Fei appropriates to 
explain his theory of xing ming. 
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nature of the Way.”76 Han Fei is most likely referring to a very similar chapter in the Lao 
Zi, Chapter Thirty-Seven, which reads: “The way never acts yet nothing is left undone. 
Should lords and princes be able to hold fast to it, the myriad creatures will be 
transformed of their own accord.” 77 Here, the ruler is exhorted to “hold fast to,” or model 
himself after the Dao and not resort to any conscious activity. The reason for such a 
policy is not explicitly given, although Lao Zi says elsewhere that “governing a large 
state is like boiling a small fish;”78 the more you handle it, the more you ruin it. D. C. Lau 
explains that the empire, being part of the natural order, will run smoothly so long as 
everyone follows his own nature, and does not presume to improve on nature by his petty 
cleverness. The least interference on the part of the ruler will upset the delicate balance of 
nature and, instead, lead to disorder.79 Consequently, the Daoist ruler must discard 
wisdom (qu zhi) and wile, and cause the people to return to their pristine condition of the 
“uncarved block,” the state of original innocence. He does this by himself being free from 
desire (wu yu), which results in “the people of themselves [becoming] simple like the 
uncarved block.”80 After the people are transformed, should desire again rear its ugly 
head, the ruler “shall press it down with the weight of the nameless uncarved block; The 
nameless uncarved block; Is but freedom from desire; And if I cease to desire and remain 
still (jing), the empire will be at peace of its own accord.”81 So it is by remaining still and 
emptying himself of desire and knowledge that the Daoist ruler, through non-action (wu 
                                                 
76 Watson, p. 38. 
77 Lao Tzu - Tao Te Ching, trans. D. C. Lau, Penguin, 1963, p. 42. 
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79 D. C. Lau, Lao Tzu, op. cit., introduction p. xxx. 
80 Lao Zi, chapter 58. 
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wei), returns the people to their original state of innocence, thereby establishing order in 
the empire. 
 Han Fei gives an entirely different account of these same terms. In “Wielding 
Power,” he exhorts the ruler to be as the Dao, “empty, still, and inactive,” so as to be able 
to compare names and results, and ensure that these match. In quiet repose, the ruler lets 
the ministers name their proposals before him, and simply makes sure that the 
achievements tally with the names. According to how these tally, he then dispenses the 
reward or punishment deserved. In order for xing ming to be effective, the ruler must put 
aside all subjective bias that could prejudice his judgement. He must “discard wisdom 
and wile” so as to “remain constant”82 and “discard both delight and hatred” so that “with 
an empty mind [he can] become the abode of the Way.”83 For Han Fei, then, it is not to 
return the people to their original state of innocence and ignorance that the ruler 
cultivates an attitude of emptiness and quietude (xu jing) and reposes in non-action (wu 
wei). Instead, the ruler must “be blank and actionless (wu wei);”84 he must discard 
knowledge and get rid of his likes and dislikes so that he can be as objective as the Dao 
in holding ministers accountable for their words.   
 Fa (laws or standards) is the third plank of Han Fei’s political philosophy. In 
“Deciding Between Two Legalistic Doctrines (定法)”, Han Fei responds to an imaginary 
inquirer who asks whether shu or fa is more urgently needed in the state. He replies by 
means of an analogy: just as both food and clothing are needed to sustain life (the latter, 
of course, in conditions of extreme cold), so too, both shu and fa are equally 
indispensable for government. He writes: 
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Tact (shu) is the means whereby to create posts according to responsibilities, hold actual 
services accountable to official titles, exercise the power over life and death, and examine 
the officials’ abilities. It is what the lord of men has in his grip. Law (fa) includes 
mandates and ordinances that are manifest in the official bureaux, penalties that are 
definite in the mind of the people, rewards that are due to the careful observers of law, 
and punishments that are inflicted on the offenders against orders. It is what the subjects 
and ministers take as model. If the ruler is tactless, delusion will come to the superior; if 
the subjects and ministers are lawless, disorder will appear among the inferiors. Thus, 
neither can be dispensed with. Both are implements of emperors and kings.”85
From this passage, we learn that shu is the ruler’s means of controlling his ministers; it is 
his weapon to guard against “delusion.” Techniques of control include xing ming and the 
ruler’s two handles of reward and punishment, by means of which he “exercises the 
power over life and death.” Fa, on the other hand, is the whole complex of public laws 
with its attendant rewards or penalties, ordinances, mandates, which together can be 
summed up as “standards.” These standards act as the ruler’s “plumb line,”86 according to 
which he makes all decisions of government. Fa also serves as the “model” of proper or 
approved conduct to which all subjects and ministers must conform. As Han Fei writes in 
“On Having Standards (有度),” fa is the most reliable instrument for “correcting the 
faults of superiors, chastising the misdeeds of subordinates, restoring order, exposing 
error, checking excess, remedying evil, and unifying the standards of the people.”87  
 As with shi and shu, Han Fei’s concept of fa, too, is based on his observations of 
the Dao. In “Observing Deeds (观行),” for example, Han Fei writes: 
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Men of antiquity, because their eyes stopped short of self-seeing, used mirrors to look at 
their faces; because their wisdom stopped short of self-knowing, they took Tao to rectify 
their characters. The mirror had no guilt of making scars seen; Tao had no demerit of 
making faults clear. Without the mirror, the eyes had no means to rectify the whiskers 
and eyebrows; without Tao, the person had no other way to know infatuation and 
bewilderment.88  
Just as the Dao is useful for rectifying behaviour by showing up a person’s faults, 
infatuations and bewilderments, fa too enables the ruler to detect the people’s faults and 
the ministers’ schemes and allows him, thereby, to rectify their behaviour.  
In “On Pretensions and Heresies (饰邪),” Han Fei suggests that fa functions in the 
human, socio-political realm as the corollary of the Dao in the natural realm. He writes: 
“Therefore, the early kings took Tao as the constant standard, and the law as the basis of 
government... The intelligent sovereign makes the people conform to the law and thereby 
knows the true path (饰于道), wherefore with ease he harvests meritorious results.”89 We 
saw earlier that in the natural realm, the Dao does not resort to any action yet leaves 
nothing undone. In the same way, this passage implies that if, in accordance with the 
Dao, the intelligent ruler disposes of all matters on the basis of fa alone, then he can rule 
in ease and nothing in the empire will be left undone. When fa is entrenched in the hearts 
and minds of the governed, then “the ruler can sleep without worries; ministers can 
rejoice in their daily work; Tao will spread all over heaven and earth; and Teh (de) will 
last throughout a myriad generations.”90
                                                 
88 Liao, vol. 1, p. 258. 
89 Liao, vol. 1, pp. 164-165. 
90 “How to Use Men: Problems of Personnel Administration (用人),” Liao, vol. 1, p. 274. 
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In summary, I have briefly tried to show in this section how Han Fei’s political 
philosophy has been influenced by a Daoist world-view. He is convinced that in order for 
government to be successful, it must be modelled on how the Dao rules the myriad 
creatures in the universe. The ruler must be like the Dao, solitary and unique from the 
ruled. His shi or authority should thus never reside in two places, and the ruler ensures 
this by removing any minister who presumes to compete with or challenge his authority. 
Since he cannot personally run all the affairs of government, the enlightened ruler wields 
his position and employs ministers to implement his fa, which constitutes his blueprint 
for reorganising society and restoring peace to the empire. Because of his need to rely on 
ministers, conniving and profiteering though they may be, the ruler uses shu to control 
them and thereby prevent them from harming him. It is by thus maintaining his august 
position, using shu to control the restive ministers and fa to direct the people, that the 
ruler is able to govern the empire with ease.   
 1.1.4 How natural is Han Fei’s naturalism? 
 I suggest that another way to cash out the debate on whether Han Fei is a legal 
positivist or a natural law theorist is in terms of asking the question: how far does Han 
Fei’s ruler go in his imitation of the Dao? Does he aspire to become like the Dao in order 
to align the human socio-political order with the natural order, or does Han Fei simply 
reduce the Dao to the ruler, thereby putting the ruler’s position beyond any questioning? 
Wang and Chang, as we expect, take the former position. They write: 
Han Fei sees the natural world and the human world in one continuum. The very same 
Tao and principle (li) pervade both worlds, and it is by being informed by the objective 
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Tao and li that the ruler is able to conform to the truly natural order of things and realise 
the fullness of his inborn potentiality.91   
Because he sees the natural and the human worlds as inter-connected, Han Fei’s 
enlightened ruler models himself after the Dao and governs according to Dao’s objective 
principle, which when applied to the human world, is fa. Wang and Chang in fact 
describe the ruler as “consciously personifying the Dao.” Just as “Dao is never a pair,” 
the ruler is unique from the ruled and rules in solitude. Just as Dao does not identify itself 
with the “ten thousand things,” so too the ruler takes a different path from his ministers.92 
In Han Fei’s scheme, then, the Dao becomes the theoretical basis for the ruler’s 
autocratic authority. 
 Schwartz, too, believes that Han Fei aspires to make government correspond to 
the Dao. He reads in the Han Fei Zi “an implication that once the true Legalist method of 
organising society has been realized, it will somehow correspond to a truly ‘natural’ 
system of human organization – a system aligned with the tao.”93 He writes: 
Once the system of rewards and punishments has become ingrained in habitual 
behaviour, once the methods of defining the proper relations of “names and 
performances” in government are in place and all the devices for controlling bureaucratic 
behaviour are operative, once the acceptance of the authority of the ruler has been 
internalised in the attitudes of all men, one will finally be able to say that the processes of 
human society correspond to the processes of the tao in nature.94
                                                 
91 Wang and Chang, The Philosophical Foundations, op. cit., p. 7. 
92 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
93 Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1985, pp. 343-344. 
94 Ibid., p. 344. 
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Such a system can only be brought about by a “Legalist-Taoist sage, [who] is able to 
draw on his higher gnosis to achieve a clear and unbeclouded understanding of the 
principles and processes which should govern human civilization.”95  
 Cheng Chung Ying reads Han Fei in much the same vein. According to Cheng, 
Han Fei believes that a ruler has to know the Dao – “the ultimate reality and ultimate 
principle of things” in order to rule successfully.96 Cheng states three reasons why the 
ruler has to know the Dao.97 First, it is only when the ruler reflects on the Dao that he can 
conceive of himself as “an ultimate power of creativity like the tao.” Next, in order to 
achieve wu wei government, he must learn from the Dao the ability to rule with 
simplicity and ease. Third, the ruler must learn from the Dao in order to be self-
controlled and to have insight into, and thereby prevent, the possible forces of decay in 
the empire. In sum, the ruler “has to know the tao not simply because of a need to justify, 
but because of the practical necessity for stable, effortless, and lasting rule.”98
 There seems to me to be an uneasy ambiguity in Cheng’s position. Although he 
appears to read Han Fei as some kind of a natural law theorist, since it is the laws of 
nature or the characteristics of the Dao that inform his political institutions and governing 
techniques, his belief that the ruler must conceive of himself as “an ultimate power of 
creativity like the tao” sounds positively positivistic! This suspicion is deepened by 
Wang and Chang’s comment that Han Fei’s ruler “consciously personifies” the Dao. We 
can see how easily their position slides into Ellen Marie Chen’s, who argues that in Han 
                                                 
95 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, op. cit., p. 345. 
96 Cheng Chung-Ying, “Metaphysics of Tao and Dialectics of Fa: An evaluation of HTSC in relations to 
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Chinese Philosophy 10, 1983, p. 253. 
97 Ibid., pp. 254-256. 
98 Ibid., p. 256. 
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Fei’s political system, the ruler has in fact reduced the Dao to his own person: “Still, like 
the primitives who dance and act out their roles behind their totem masks, Han Fei’s ruler 
camouflages himself with Nature and mimics the ways of Nature such that it is not he but 
Tao or Nature that is acting.”99 Close as their positions might seem, Chen’s account of 
Han Fei is vastly different from Wang and Chang’s account. The latter believe that for 
Han Fei, the ruler must imitate the Dao because the human world functions as a 
microcosm of the natural world. Chen, however, believes that Han Fei has surreptitiously 
reduced the Dao to nothing more than the ruler. It is not surprising then that Chen reaches 
the very opposite conclusion from Wang and Chang, and insists that Han Fei is a legal 
positivist through and through. She writes, “[Han Fei’s] ruler, through mimicking Nature 
in every way, has completely usurped the place of Nature. In the Han Fei Tzu, we witness 
the dangerous situation of a reason which by parading itself as Nature abolishes all its 
own limitations.”100 As an aside, Chen’s comment also highlights the reason for our fear 
of legal positivism. Such a fear is really driven by the belief in the West that legal 
positivism, by removing all constraints on the ruler, contributed ultimately to the 
emergence of wicked Nazi laws. Similarly, we fear that if Han Fei’s ruler were not 
answerable to a higher authority like the Dao, then all forms of abuse would be 
permissible.  
 How natural, then, is Han Fei’s naturalism? Is he genuinely interested in 
discovering the Dao in order to correlate the operations of the state with the operations of 
the cosmos, or is he simply “parading” as the Dao so as to fortify the power of the ruler 
in what then turns out to be a remarkable piece of political sleight of hand? The problem 
                                                 
99 Ellen Marie Chen, “The Dialectic of Chih (Reason) and Tao (Nature) in the Han Fei Tzu, Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 3, 1975, p. 1. 
100 Ibid., p. 15. 
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with the Han Fei Zi is that both readings seem to be equally consistent with the text. This 
problem is compounded by Han Fei’s apparent belief that only the Legalist-Daoist ruler 
who possesses something like the mystic gnosis is able to apprehend the Dao and govern 
in accordance with it. Chad Hansen writes, “Han Feizi saw Laozi’s negative dao as an 
authoritarian theory of political leadership based on asserting an absolute point of view. 
Special people can access this point of view using the techniques of ‘empty, unified, and 
still.’... Xunzi and Hanfeizi, quite predictably, each separately suppose that this neutral, 
objective, transcendent, mystical point of view is their own!”101 If Han Fei alone has this 
privileged access to the Dao, however, his claim that his is the correct Way of 
government is simply unverifiable.  
1.2 A stalemate?  
We began this chapter by asking why Han Fei borrows from Daoism. Is he a 
genuine Daoist or is he simply a Machiavellian in Daoist guise? We learnt that Western 
scholars typically cast this question in terms of whether Han Fei is a natural law theorist 
or a legal positivist. One camp of scholars, represented by Peerenboom, reads Han Fei as 
a legal positivist and concludes that he distorts Daoism for his own purposes.  The other 
camp, represented by Wang and Chang, insists that Han Fei is some kind of natural law 
theorist; that he is a genuine adherent of the Dao who consciously fashions his laws and 
institutions after it. We thought that this debate would throw up some clues as to the 
relationship between law and morality in the Han Fei Zi. If Han Fei were shown to be a 
legal positivist, then on Hart’s account of legal positivism, he must deny a necessary 
connection between law and morality. Because of how legal positivism has come to be 
                                                 
101 Chad Hansen, “Han Feizi: The Ruler’s Interpretation,” in A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: a 
philosophical interpretation, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 371-372. 
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associated with the horrors of the Nazi experience, not a few scholars conclude that Han 
Fei must therefore be a defender of despots. If, on the other hand, Han Fei turned out to 
be a natural law theorist, then the traditional scholarship on Han Fei would need to be 
reconsidered. However, by the end of our investigation, it appears that a good case can be 
made for both the positivist and natural law readings of the Han Fei Zi, which leaves us 
not any wiser as to how law and morality are related in Han Fei’s writings.  
 It is perhaps wrongheaded to even think about the relationship between law and 
morality in the Han Fei Zi in terms of where Han Fei stands in the natural law-legal 
positivist debate. For one, Western scholars who engage in this debate tend to display a 
very crude understanding of the difference between legal positivism and natural law. To 
better understand this difference, let me quote Hart at length: 
There are many different types of relation between law and morals and there is nothing 
which can be profitably singled out as the relation between them. Instead it is important 
to distinguish some of the many different things which may be meant by the assertion or 
denial that law and morals are related. Sometimes what is asserted is a kind of connexion 
which few if ever have denied; but its indisputable existence may be wrongly accepted as 
a sign of some more dubious connexion, or even mistaken for it. Thus it cannot be 
seriously disputed that the development of law, at all times and places, has in fact been 
profoundly influenced both by the conventional morality and ideals of particular social 
groups, and also by forms of enlightened moral criticism urged by individuals, whose 
moral horizon has transcended the morality currently accepted. But it is possible to take 
this truth illicitly, as a warrant for a different proposition: namely, that a legal system 
must exhibit some specific conformity with morality or justice, or must rest on a widely 
diffused conviction that there is a moral obligation to obey it. Again, though this 
proposition may, in some sense, be true, it does not follow from it that the criteria of legal 
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validity of particular laws used in a legal system must include, tacitly if not explicitly, a 
reference to morality or justice.102
According to Hart, legal positivists do not deny that laws can and often do reflect moral 
considerations. The crux of their disagreement with natural law theorists is that laws must 
conform to certain moral standards in order to be legally valid. He would argue that it is 
pointless to assert, as Augustine and Aquinas have variously done, that “an unjust law is 
no law at all.”103 Withholding legal recognition from iniquitous rules may, on the 
contrary, “grossly oversimplify the variety of moral issues to which they give rise.”104 
Critics of Han Fei who label him a legal positivist, however, use this term very crudely to 
imply that he was totally unconcerned with morality. Peerenboom, for instance, writes to 
justify his claim that Han Fei “shares [Hart’s] belief that morality and the law need not 
coincide:” “Han Fei is wholly unimpressed with virtue for virtue’s sake.”105 For Hart, 
however, this would be a gross misunderstanding of his minimum separation thesis. On 
this thesis, Han Fei could well be interested in virtue for virtue’s sake; he could even be a 
staunch defender of moral values, and yet still be a legal positivist. He would only cease 
to be one if he held that morality sets the standard for legal validity, or put more simply, 
that unjust or immoral laws are invalid laws. So it is utterly unhelpful to think about how 
law and morality are related by asking the question of whether Han Fei is a natural law 
theorist or legal positivist. 
 This approach is also wrongheaded in a different way. We thought that by 
showing Han Fei to be a genuine Daoist, and therefore a natural law theorist on 
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Peerenboom’s account, we would have succeeded in establishing a necessary connection 
between law and morality in his writings. It would then be wrong to assert, as many 
critics do, that Han Fei accords the ruler vast powers to create laws without any regard 
for morality. However, this argument is problematised by the fact some scholars regard 
Daoism as ‘amoral,’106 or as a “non-ethics.”107 If Daoism were indeed ‘amoral,’ then even 
if we show Han Fei to be a genuine Daoist, we would still not have established any 
relation between law and morality in his writings.  
 What we need to do instead is to specify the type of relation between law and 
morality that we are interested in. I suggest that, basically, we want to answer the 
questions: Is Han Fei the defender of despots that critics make him out to be? Is there 
some implicit morality in his system, one that is admittedly different to the conventional 
morality espoused by the Confucians? These questions are better answered by exploring 
Han Fei’s goal for government, and testing the commonly held belief that he sought first 
and foremost to benefit the ruler at the people’s expense. This will be our task in the next 
chapter.
                                                 
106 I think such a criticism came about because of statements in the Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi exhorting people 
to forget about ren (仁) and yi (义), and Zhuang Zi’s saying that even robbers have their own dao. 
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academic ideology: a hermeneutico-semiotic study, Peter Lang, 1997. See sections titled “Taoist Ethical 
Nihilism” and “The Taoist Challenge to Epistemology of Confucian Ethics,” pp. 258-284.  
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Chapter Two: Han Fei – a closet Confucian?  
 We began this study with the question: What is the relationship between law and 
morality in the Han Fei Zi? Is Han Fei advocating a complete break between law and 
morality in a bid to secure absolute power for the ruler? In Chapter One, we tried to 
answer the question by exploring the Daoist influence on Han Fei. We thought that if it 
could be shown that his laws are somehow constrained by the Dao, then he cannot be 
said to be “amoral.” However, by the end of the chapter, we saw that the textual evidence 
was inconclusive since both the positivist and natural law readings seem equally 
plausible. Furthermore, even if we could prove Han Fei to be a genuine Daoist, if it turns 
out that the Dao itself is amoral, as some claim, then our investigation into his 
relationship with Daoism would be futile. In this next chapter, I will attempt to answer 
the question by, instead, trying to understand the raison d’être of government for Han Fei. 
I will argue that politics are tied to moral considerations in Han Fei’s scheme because in 
spite of his disagreement with the Confucians over the means to benefit the people (li 
min: 利民), he shares their fundamental belief that this is the ultimate end of government.  
2.1 Government for the ruler or for the people? 
 The standard view of Han Fei is that he is a defender of despots. Vitaly Rubin is 
certainly thinking of Han Fei when he makes the more general charge, that “Legalist law 
was intended to serve the despot, not to limit him.1 James Landers, who wrote his 
doctoral dissertation on “The Political Thought of Han Fei,” compares Han Fei with his 
Confucian teacher, Xun Zi, and observes: “Hsun-tzu’s objective was to have a state 
which considered only the welfare of the people while Han Fei wanted a citizenry whose 
                                                 
1 Vitaly A. Rubin, Individual and State in Ancient China – essays on four Chinese philosophers, trans. 
Steven I. Levine, Columbia University Press, New York, 1976, p. 70. 
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only concern was for the welfare of the state.”2 Watson expresses this same view in the 
introduction to his translation of Han Fei’s basic writings: “[Legalism] addressed itself 
exclusively to the rulers, taking no interest in private individuals or their lives except to 
the extent that they affected the interests of the ruling class.”3 In short, the standard view 
sums up Han Fei’s political philosophy in the aphorism: “government of the ruler, by the 
ruler, for the ruler.”4
 I think a closer examination of Han Fei’s writings in fact shows him to be more 
aligned with his Confucian adversaries than he would care to admit. Before examining 
his writings, however, we need to clarify exactly what is meant by the term “li min.” For 
this, it might be helpful to refer to Roger Ames’ study of “The Art of Rulership,”5 where 
a whole chapter is devoted to explaining “li min,” and comparing the various schools’ 
commitment to it. In this chapter, Ames argues that “throughout The Art of Rulership, 
there is a sustained attempt to subordinate the interests of the ruler to the welfare of the 
people. This theme [is] notably the converse of traditional Legalist doctrine.”6 He writes 
further on: “...This theme of giving primacy to the welfare of the people can be 
characterised as ‘benefiting the people’ (li min).”7 Ames qualifies that in The Art of 
Rulership, as in most early texts, “li is applied socially to represent the positive meaning 
of ‘benefit,’ and applied personally with the pejorative sense of ‘self-interest’.”8 He then 
                                                 
2 Throughout the Han Fei Zi, Han Fei conflates the interests of the state with the interests of the ruler. 
James Russell Landers, “The Political Thought of Han Fei,” Indiana University, Ph. D., 1972.  
3 Burton Watson, Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings, Columbia University Press, 1964, pp. 6-7.   
4 Roger Ames, The Art of Rulership, University of Hawaii Press, 1983, p. 50. 
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6 Ibid., p. 153. 
7 Ibid., p. 154. 
8 Ibid., p. 155. 
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argues that The Art of Rulership fuses “the basically Legalist notion of manipulating the 
natural human devotion to self-interest with the Confucian-Mohist principle of li min – 
benefiting the people.”9 According to Ames, The Art of Rulership differs “substantially” 
from Legalism by asserting that the ruler’s interests coincide with those of his people.10 
In contrast, “the Legalist thinkers ... were adamant that the sole purpose of government is 
to serve the ruler’s interests. If benefiting the people is conducive to this end, Legalist 
doctrine says benefit them, but where the interests of the ruler and the people are at cross 
purposes, there is no question whose interests must be served.”11  
 I disagree with Ames’ reading of Han Fei because a close study of the Han Fei Zi 
reveals that Han Fei, like the Confucians, was primarily concerned with the people’s 
welfare. In “Asking T‘ien: Two Dialogues (问田),” Han Fei responds to T‘ang-ch‘i 
Kung, who warns him against propounding principles of law and tact, lest he suffers the 
same fate as Wu Ch‘i and Lord Shang, who met violent deaths because their proposals 
were too radical for their times and rulers. Han Fei replies: 
Indeed, the exercise of the ruling authority of All-under-Heaven and the unification of the 
regulation of the masses is not an easy task. Nevertheless, the reason why thy servant has 
given up your honourable teachings [or the teachings of the former kings]12 and is 
practising his own creeds is that thy servant personally regards the formulation of the 
principles of law and tact and the establishment of the standards of regulations and 
measures as the right way to benefit the masses of people (li min). Therefore, not to fear 
the threat and outrage of the violent sovereign and stupid superior but to scheme 
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10 Ibid., p. 156. 
11 Ibid., p. 157. 
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definitely for the advantages of unifying the people, is an act of benevolence and wisdom 
(仁智); whereas to fear the threat and outrage of the violent sovereign and stupid superior 
and thereby evade the calamity of death, is a clear understanding of personal advantages, 
and to ignore the public benefit of the masses, is an act of greed and meanness. Since thy 
servant cannot bear entertaining the act of greed and meanness and dare not destroy the 
act of benevolence and wisdom, though Master has the kind intention to make thy servant 
happy, yet in fact it will be detrimental to thy servant.13  
What emerges from this passage is the picture of a man who was attuned to the harsh 
realities of his day and who firmly believed that the only way to benefit the people in 
those chaotic times was to discard the ancients’ prescription for order, and instead, 
uphold the principles of law and tact. Han Fei found himself thrust onto the political stage 
during the turbulent Warring States period (480-221 B.C.), which as its name suggests, 
was marked by incessant interstate wars. This situation of internecine strife also 
coincided with the breakdown of the feudal order in China, which completely overturned 
social norms and left the people in a state of utter confusion, on top of having to suffer 
the consequences of war. Han Fei was convinced that his Legalist programme was the 
cure to the prevailing political disorder and was prepared to forego any personal 
advantage, even face the threat of death, in order to li min or benefit the people. He 
believed that his, rather than the Confucians’ theory of benevolent government, was the 
truly benevolent and wise way to govern. For us who have the benefit of hindsight, the 
dramatic irony in the above passage is glaring as it eerily foreshadows Han Fei’s eventual 
death as decreed by the King of Qin in 233 B.C.  
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 We get another glimpse of Han Fei’s ultimate goal for government in this 
following passage from “Ministers Apt to Betray, Molest, or Murder Ruler (奸劫弑臣).” 
In this chapter, Han Fei berates the “stupid scholars of the world,” who are oblivious to 
the actual conditions of chaos and insist on chanting “hackneyed old books” which are no 
cure to the present disorder. The sage, however, acts differently:  
... [W]hen governing the state he rectifies laws clearly and establishes penalties severely 
in order to rescue all living beings from chaos, rid All-under-Heaven of misfortune, 
prohibit the strong from exploiting the weak and the many from oppressing the few, 
enable the old and the infirm to die in peace and the young and the orphan to grow freely, 
and see to it that the frontiers be not invaded, that ruler and minister be intimate with each 
other, that father and son support each other, and that there be no worry about being 
killed in war or taken prisoner.14
Again, we see that a deep concern for the people lies at the heart of Han Fei’s political 
programme. What is striking about this passage is its uncanny resemblance to 
descriptions of the ideal Confucian state. A typical portrait of the Confucian state is 
painted for us in Mencius IA7, where Mencius instructs King Hsüan of Ch‘i on how to 
practice benevolent government. He argues that first and foremost, the ruler must ensure 
that the people have the means to support themselves. Only when their basic material 
needs are met can they have constant hearts to practice self-cultivation. He says:  
“Hence when determining what means of support the people should have, a clear-sighted 
ruler ensures that these are sufficient, on the one hand, for the care of parents, and on the 
other, for the support of wife and children, so that the people always have sufficient food 
in good years and escape starvation in bad; only then does he drive them towards 
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goodness; in this way the people find it easy to follow him ... If you wish to put this into 
practice, why not go back to fundamentals? If the mulberry is planted in every homestead 
of five mu of land, then those who are fifty can wear silk; if chickens, pigs and dogs do 
not miss their breeding season, then those who are seventy can eat meat; if each lot of 
five hundred mu is not deprived of labour during the busy seasons, then families with 
several mouths to feed will not go hungry. Exercise due care over the education provided 
by village schools, and discipline the people by teaching them duties proper to sons and 
younger brothers, and those whose heads have turned grey will not be carrying loads on 
the roads. When the aged wear silk and eat meat and the masses are neither cold nor 
hungry, it is impossible for their prince not to be a true King.”15  
This passage is similar to the earlier one quoted from the Han Fei Zi in its insistence that 
government is for the people. Both Han Fei and Mencius agree that it is the ruler’s 
prerogative to “rescue all living beings from chaos” and restore peace in the land so that 
the people can grow freely and support themselves. In both their descriptions of the ideal 
state, peace prevails; there is “no worry about being killed in war or taken prisoner,” and 
men are not whisked from the fields to fight. The weakest and most vulnerable members 
of society – the orphan and the infirm, the young and the old, are also cared for and not 
left hungry and cold. In such a condition of peace, the people relate to one another 
harmoniously; ruler and ministers are intimate with each other and fathers and sons 
support each other. In contrast to Han Fei, however, Mencius believed that government 
for the people could not stop at merely providing for their material well-being. Restoring 
peace to the state and ensuring that the people had a constant means of support was only 
a precondition for ultimately driving the people towards goodness. That Han Fei did not 
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see this as a proper end of government is largely due to his bleak understanding of human 
nature. He did not share the Confucian’s optimism in the innate goodness of man. As 
such, he regarded their goal of educating the people in virtue as naive and impracticable.  
 More fundamentally, Han Fei disagreed with the Confucians on how to restore 
peace to the empire. Han Fei lived in an age of incessant inter-state warfare. The social 
norms that governed human interactions had all but broken down, leaving “the strong to 
exploit the weak and the many to oppress the few.” He was convinced that the only way 
to cure such disorder and benefit the people was to “rectify laws clearly” and “establish 
penalties severely.” Mencius, on the other hand, believed that order could be restored 
internally through education, by teaching the people “the duties proper to sons and 
younger brothers.” We see then that the crux of Han Fei’s quarrel with the Confucians is 
their disagreement over the means to secure benefit for the people, and not the end of 
government.  
 Someone would object, surely it is not enough to just cite a few passages from the 
Han Fei Zi to establish the claim that Han Fei espouses government for the people. How 
can we be sure that Han Fei is not simply paying lip service to this ideal in order to win 
support for or justify his draconian policies? I think the first thing to be said against such 
an objection is that the doctrine of absolute despotism does not need popular support. If 
Han Fei were pitching his Legalist programme to a despot, there would be no need to 
even pretend that he is concerned with the people’s welfare. On the contrary, Han Fei 
would need to convince the despot why it is in his interests to govern for the people. That 
said, however, critics find it extremely difficult to square Han Fei’s apparent concern for 
the people with his draconian policies, which appear to benefit the ruler at the people’s 
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expense. From the passage quoted above, for example, how are severe penalties 
compatible with his goal to “rescue all living beings from chaos” and enable all to live in 
peace? Surely the harsh and merciless penalties that Han Fei prescribes terrorise the 
people rather than bring about the harmony and serenity that is described! The question 
really is how we can reconcile Han Fei’s avowed goal of benefiting the people with the 
preponderance of textual evidence that suggests otherwise – that he in fact defends 
government for the ruler. For besides advocating harsh penalties (even for small crimes), 
Han Fei also recommends getting rid of scholars and dissenters, a heavy-handed 
treatment of ministers and a “totalitarian” control over the empire. He tops this all off by 
publicly renouncing conventional morality. 
 In the following section, I will examine some of this evidence and try to show that 
it is not incompatible with Han Fei’s genuine commitment to li min. 
2.2 A defence of Han Fei 
 K.K. Lee writes, “The Legalists showed the inadequacy and even irrelevance of 
moral notions to political philosophy. They were fully aware that law and morality are 
distinct, although overlapping in some areas.”16 I will argue in this section that in spite of 
Han Fei’s call to harshness and deceit in politics, law and morality are not two distinct, 
and accidentally “overlapping” spheres in his scheme. Contrarily, law and morality in the 
Han Fei Zi are intrinsically linked because Han Fei’s entire political edifice is 




                                                 
16 K.K. Lee, “The Legalist School and Legal Positivism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3, 1975, p. 27. 
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2.2.1  Harsh penalties benefit the people? 
Macabre as it sounds, Han Fei argues precisely that harsh penalties benefit the 
people. Consider this passage from “Surmising the Mentality of the People: A 
Psychological Analysis of Politics (心度):”17  
The sage in governing the people considers their springs of action, never tolerates their 
wicked desires, but seeks only for the people’s benefit (li min). Therefore, the penalty he 
inflicts is not due to any hatred for the people, but to his motive of loving the people. If 
penalty triumphs, the people are quiet; if reward over-flows, culprits appear. Therefore 
the triumph of penalty is the beginning of order; the overflow of reward, the origin of 
chaos.18 [Italics mine] 
In this passage, Han Fei explicitly ties the people’s benefit to their being inflicted with 
severe penalties. Moreover, he makes the astonishing claim that visiting these harsh 
punishments on the people is in fact a display of the ruler’s love for them! Han Fei makes 
this same claim later on in the chapter when he writes, “penalty is the beginning of 
love.”19
 How is meting out harsh punishments tantamount to loving the people or 
benefiting them? According to Han Fei, this makes sense once we understand human 
psychology. Looking around him, Han Fei drew two conclusions about human nature. 
First, human beings have a natural propensity to do bad. Second, one of the main 
motivations of human behaviour is the fear of punishment. Hence, he believed that only 
the most severe and brutal penalties could deter people from committing crimes, and in 
                                                 
17 I quite like Liao’s translation of “xin du” because it aptly captures what Han Fei does in this chapter, 
which is to show how his government measures derive from an understanding of human psychology.   
18 Liao, vol. 2, p. 326. 
19 Liao, vol. 2, p. 327. 
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this way escape punishment altogether. In “Ministers Apt to Betray, Molest, or Murder 
Ruler,” for example, Han Fei writes: 
Indeed, severe penalty is what the people fear, heavy punishment is what the people hate. 
Accordingly, the wise man promulgates what they fear in order to forbid the practice of 
wickedness and establishes what they hate in order to prevent villainous acts.20
The point is made even clearer in “Six Contrarieties (六反),” where Han Fei defends 
himself against critics who were charging that heavy penalties injure the people. 
According to these critics, since light penalties suffice to suppress villainy, it is totally 
unnecessary to resort to the harsh punitive measures that Han Fei was recommending. In 
his defence, Han Fei writes: 
To be sure, what is stopped by heavy penalties is not necessarily stopped by light 
penalties; but what is stopped by light penalties is always stopped by heavy penalties. For 
this reason, where the superior sets up heavy penalties, there all culprits disappear. If all 
culprits disappear, how can the application of heavy penalties be detrimental to the 
people? In the light of the so-called ‘harsh penalties,’ what the culprits gain is slight, but 
what the superior inflicts, is great. As the people never venture a big penalty for a small 
gain, malefactions will eventually disappear. In the face of the so-called ‘light penalties,’ 
however, what the culprits gain, is great, but what the superior inflicts, is slight. As the 
people long for the profit and ignore the slight punishment, malefactions never will 
disappear. Thus, the early sages had a proverb, saying: “Nobody stumbles against a 
mountain, but everybody trips over an ant-hill.” The mountain being large, everyone 
takes notice of it; the ant-hill being small, everyone disregards it. Now supposing 
penalties were light, people would disregard them ... For this reason, the policy of light 
                                                 
20 Liao, vol. 1, p. 128. 
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punishment would either plunge the state into confusion or set traps for the people. Such 
a policy may thus be said to be detrimental to the people.21 [Italics mine] 
In the light of man’s natural tendency to seek profit and avoid loss or harm, Han Fei 
argues that the harm inflicted by penalties must exceed the benefit to the person of 
committing a crime. Thus, the ruler ought to lay down the severest penalties, in order to 
make the cost of committing crime so high that no one would risk it. In this way, the ruler 
in fact benefits the people by his harshness, since he thereby spares them the fate of 
punishment altogether.  
Interestingly, in this passage, Han Fei echoes the Confucian belief that laws trap 
the people. Mencius had argued that it is important for rulers to provide the people with a 
constant means of support because, otherwise, they will lack constant hearts and “lacking 
constant hearts, they will go astray and get into excesses, stopping at nothing. To punish 
them after they have fallen foul of the law is to set a trap for the people,” which a 
benevolent man in authority surely cannot allow himself to do.22 Mencius points out 
plainly that if the people’s basic material needs are not met, they cannot concentrate on 
cultivating their virtue. This will result in them going astray and even falling into crime. 
To not pre-empt the problem by providing for the people’s needs, but instead, to punish 
them only after they have fallen afoul of the law is, Mencius argues, tantamount to setting 
a trap for the people. The logic here is that by not first supplying the people with the 
means to survive, the ruler is in effect driving them to transgress the law and, thereafter, 
to face sure punishment. For Han Fei, however, it is not the law per se with its attendant 
penalties that traps the people. Instead, it is “the policy of light punishment” that traps the 
                                                 
21 Liao, vol. 2, p. 244. 
22 Mencius IIIA3, trans. D. C. Lau, op. cit., p. 97. 
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people. According to Han Fei, setting up light penalties would result in people 
disregarding the risk of punishment and venturing to transgress the law. Inevitably, in his 
proposed system of tight and constant surveillance, they would get caught in the dragnet 
of the law, and face inescapable punishment. Han Fei illustrates this by making apt use of 
an old proverb. He compares the laying down of light penalties to putting “ant-hills” in 
the people’s paths; both cause them to trip and stumble. Such a policy is therefore 
detrimental to the people.  
Borrowing from Shang Yang,23 Han Fei summarises his policy of heavy 
punishment in the principle, “abolishing penalties by means of penalties (以刑去刑),” 
which he explains in “Making Orders Trim (饬令)”: “In inflicting penalties light offences 
should be punished severely; if light offences do not appear, heavy offences will not 
come. This is said to be to abolish penalties by means of penalties.”24 Here, it is worth 
noting the extent of the application of this principle. Han Fei is not merely advocating 
heavy penalties for major offences; he is advocating heavy penalties for even minor 
infractions. This runs counter to Western theories of justice, which typically require that 
punishments be proportionate to the crime. For Han Fei, however, the most effective way 
to benefit the people is for the ruler to enable them to avoid punishment altogether, and 
this by severely punishing even minor crimes.  
Although he attributes his theory of punishment ultimately to Shang Yang, Han 
Fei also appears to be influenced by the Daoist idea of tackling a problem at its root. 
Consider this passage from “Surmising the Mentality of the People:”  
                                                 
23 In “Inner Congeries of Sayings, The Upper Series: Seven Tacts (内储说上七术),” Han Fei attributes this 
principle to Shang Yang. See Liao, vol. 1, p. 295. 
24 Liao, vol. 2, p. 325. 
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Indeed, it is the people’s nature to delight in disorder and detach themselves from legal 
restraints. Therefore, when the intelligent sovereign governs the state, if he makes 
rewards clear, the people will be encouraged to render meritorious services; if he makes 
penalties severe, the people will attach themselves to the law. If they are encouraged to 
render meritorious services, public affairs will not be obstructed; if they attach 
themselves to the law, culprits will not appear. Therefore, he who governs the people 
should nip the evil in the bud.25 [Italics mine] 
We see the Daoist influence on Han Fei even more clearly in “Criticisms of the Ancients, 
Series Three (难三),” where he quotes directly from Chapter Sixty-Three of the Lao Zi to 
justify punishing a crime in its infancy: 
The enlightened ruler sees an evil in the bud, wherefore the people cannot plot any large-
scale rebellion. As he inflicts small punishments [when the evil is still in its bud]26, the 
people cannot cause any serious disturbance. This means to “contemplate a difficulty 
when it is easy and manage a great thing when it is small.”27
As we have concluded in Chapter One, it is impossible to know Han Fei’s real motives 
for borrowing from Daoism. Suffice it to say that if his theory of punishment is somehow 
generated by his observations of the Dao, then it is a further, albeit unnecessary, proof 
that he is not advocating severe penalties because of a mere fixation with power.   
 To summarise, in this section, I have argued that although Han Fei’s policy of 
harsh penalties is ostensibly an instrument for enhancing the ruler’s power and therefore 
seemingly at odds with the concept of li min, it is in fact motivated by Han Fei’s concern 
to benefit the people, based on his understanding of human nature.  
                                                 
25 Liao, vol. 2, p. 326. 
26 I think this is a better translation for “行小诛于细,” which Liao translates as, “As he inflicts small 
punishments for minor offences.” 
27 Liao, vol. 2, p. 178. 
 48
2.2.2 Han Fei’s purges 
 Critics see Han Fei’s purging of opponents and dissenters as further proof that he 
is primarily interested in government for the ruler. In “Outer Congeries of Sayings, 
Lower Left Series (外储说左下),” for example, Han Fei sanctions Fei Chung’s 
recommendation to censure or kill (诛)28 the Earl of the West, Ch‘ang, for undermining 
the people’s allegiance to the ruler, Chow:  
Fei Chung spoke to Chow: “The Earl of the West, Ch‘ang, is worthy. The hundred 
surnames like him. The feudal lords turn to him. He must be censured. If not ousted, he 
will be a menace to the Yin Dynasty.” “You are speaking,” said Chow, “of a righteous 
lord. Why should he be censured?” In reply Fei Chung said: “The crown, however worn 
out, is always put on the head; the shoes, though decorated with five colours, are trodden 
upon the ground. Now the Earl of the West, Ch‘ang, is subordinate to Your Majesty. He 
has practiced righteousness, wherefore people turn to him. Surely, it must be Ch‘ang who 
will eventually become a trouble to All-under-Heaven. Any minister who does not serve 
his master with his worthiness must be censured. Moreover, being the ruler, Your 
Majesty censures a guilty minister. How can there be any fault in so doing? “Indeed with 
benevolence and righteousness the ruler encourages the subjects. Now that Ch‘ang is 
fond of benevolence and righteousness, it is impracticable to censure him.” Though 
persuaded for three times, he never listened. Hence followed the fall of Yin.29  
To properly appreciate the extent of Han Fei’s purges, I think it is apt to drop the 
euphemism, ‘censure,’ and replace it with ‘kill’ or ‘exterminate.’ Han Fei was not merely 
advocating the dismissal or censure of menaces in the government; he was calling for the 
extermination of ministers who threatened the ruler’s position. Consider this other 
                                                 
28 The Chinese character “诛” can be translated as “to censure” (Liao) or “to kill” (Zhang Jue). 
29 Liao, vol. 2, pp. 74-75. 
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passage from “Outer Congeries of Sayings, Upper Right Series.” Here, Han Fei is 
illustrating the point that a sovereign should remove those ministers who refuse to be 
transformed by his influence or position (shi).30 He tells of a T‘ai-kung Wang, who upon 
receiving rule of the country ordered the immediate execution of two retired scholars, 
K‘uang-yü and Hua-shih. When asked by Duke Tan of Chou why he killed two worthies, 
T‘ai-kung Wang replied: 
“These two brothers had set up the principle: ‘Neither of us would minister to the Son of 
Heaven and make friends with the feudal lords. We would till and work and live on the 
crops and dig a well and drink the water. We would not ask anybody for help and receive 
neither title from any superior nor emolument from any ruler. We attend not to any 
official post but to our own physical strength.’ Their refusal to minister to the Son of 
Heaven forecast Wang’s inability to rule them as subjects. Their refusal to make friends 
with the feudal lords forecast Wang’s inability to set them to work. Their pledge to till 
and work and live on the crops and dig a well and drink on the water and thereby ask 
nobody for help forecast Wang’s inability to encourage them with reward and prohibit 
them with punishment ... To let them become celebrated without bearing arms and 
wearing armour and become famous without tilling the land and weeding the farm is not 
the way to give teaching to the country ... [Just like the best steed in All-under Heaven 
that refused to be driven] Similarly, the two brothers proclaimed themselves worthy 
personages of the world but would not work for any sovereign. However worthy their 
deeds might be, if they would not work for the ruler, they were not what the enlightened 
sovereign ought to take as subjects ... This was the reason why they were executed 
(诛).”31
                                                 
30 See Canon One. Liao, vol. 2, p. 86. 
31 Liao, vol. 2, pp. 95-96. 
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These two passages seem almost like pages out of Hitler or Stalin’s memoirs. Who can 
forget their infamous campaigns to consolidate power by purging opponents and 
dissenters? Their purges should not shock if we consider that several centuries earlier, 
Han Fei advocated a similar policy to consolidate the ruler’s position. But surely, we ask, 
how can Han Fei claim to be benefiting the people when, as seen in the first passage, he 
sanctions the removal of a minister precisely in virtue of the latter’s benevolence and 
righteousness toward the people? And how can he be said to be benefiting the people 
when he commends the brutal killing of two retired worthies, who simply wanted to 
withdraw from the public sphere to practice their private virtue?  
 In the first passage, Han Fei approves of Fei Chung’s recommendation because he 
believes that a proper distinction must be maintained between a ruler and his ministers.32 
Just as a crown, no matter how worn-out, is always put on the head, and shoes, no matter 
how beautifully decorated, are to be trodden upon the ground, so too, a minister, however 
worthy, must know his proper place and “serve his master with his worthiness.” By, 
instead, vying with his ruler for the people’s allegiance, the Earl of the West severely 
undermined the former’s shi or power, and thus had to be removed, even killed. If we 
recall from Chapter One the central importance of shi to Han Fei’s political programme, 
it is perhaps easier to exonerate him. For Han Fei believed that the only way to order the 
empire in that chaotic age was to have the ruler make use of his “august position (shi)” to 
control his ambitious ministers, who were perpetually scheming to oust him and grab 
power for themselves. Since the ruler had no choice but to rely on such ministers to run 
the innumerable affairs of government, it was crucial for him to wield his position so as 
                                                 
32 The cited passage is part of Han Fei’s annotation to Canon Three, which states that rulers must be 
properly distinguished from their ministers.  
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to get them to serve him with their talents. If the ruler allowed his ministers to undermine 
his position with their talents or virtues, then like Chow, he would inevitably be 
overthrown and the Dynasty would see a concomitant collapse. The conflict in the empire 
would, in this way, never cease and the people would never enjoy peace.  
In the second passage cited above, the two worthies were killed precisely because 
they refused to put their talents and intelligence to work for their ruler. They also posed 
such a grave threat to the ruler because, unlike the masses, they were not amenable to the 
ruler’s control. For the vast majority of the population, Han Fei’s ruler could rely on his 
two handles of reward and punishment to either entice or whip them into working for the 
benefit of the state. The problem with such scholars as K‘uang-yü and Hua-shih was that 
they could not be motivated by either rank and emolument or censure and punishment. In 
an interesting parallel, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for 
Security and Defence, Dr Tony Tan, recently expressed the same difficulty in dealing 
with terrorists. In an address to the Parliament, he declared that Singapore would not 
negotiate with terrorists for the release of any hostages because these terrorists “cannot be 
persuaded by normal human interests.”33 Han Fei was convinced that these scholars who 
lay outside the ambit of the ruler’s control were severely undermining the ruler’s shi, 
since they could not be transformed and put to work by it. Such intransigence needed to 
be dealt with harshly, lest the people look to their negative example and similarly refuse 
to serve the ruler. 
Furthermore, these scholars were confusing the ruler’s standards by proclaiming 
themselves worthy even though they neither took up arms nor tilled the land, which were 
                                                 
33 Quoted in an article titled “S’pore ‘won’t negotiate’ with terrorists,” by M. Nirmala, published in The 
Straits Times, on July 21, 2004. 
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the two stipulated means to gain honour and reputation. If the people learnt that there was 
an easier route to achieving fame than to risk their lives at war or to toil at the fields, 
then, Han Fei argued, they would surely opt for the easier route. Consequently, the fields 
would lie in neglect and no one would go to war. Such a weakened state would be ready 
prey for its stronger neighbours, and its people would forever remain in the throes of war.  
In summary, brutal as they may seem, Han Fei saw his purges as necessary for the 
long-term benefit of the people. To put this in context, even the most diverse thinkers of 
his day, from the Confucians to the Mohists, believed that the only way to benefit the 
people in the long-term was to put a decisive end to the warring by unifying the empire. 
Han Fei firmly believed that a ruler who allowed dissidents and opponents to undermine 
his shi would eventually lose all ability to control the people and channel their energies 
toward unification. This could only spell more prolonged suffering for the people.   
2.2.3 Han Fei’s Orwellian state 
Many doubts remain after the last section concerning Han Fei’s genuine 
commitment to li min. How can Han Fei claim to be benefiting the people when in his 
state, the people seem to be reduced to mere cogs in a machine, having worth only insofar 
as they perform a useful function in the state machinery? More fundamentally, what 
benefit is there to the people when the ruler is allowed such extensive control over every 
aspect of their lives, dictating what they should do and how they should live? As Ames 
puts it, “In the Han Fei Tzu, the ruler’s policy of yung chung – in this case, ‘exploiting 
the people’ is perhaps a better rendering – is set against the inadequacy of his reliance on 
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his own abilities. The point is that the ruler’s own interests can best be served by 
orchestrating the collective energies of his people.”34 [Italics mine] 
As I have suggested in the previous section, Han Fei was not alone in thinking 
that the way to a lasting peace lay in the unification of the empire. Even the Confucians, 
who were Han Fei’s most bitter opponents, saw in unification the only way to end the 
incessant inter-state warring. Where they disagreed was on how this unification could or 
should be achieved. We see evidence of this in Mencius IA6, which records Mencius’ 
conversation with King Hsiang of Liang, who asked how the Empire could be settled 
(定): 
 “Through unity (一),” I [Mencius] said. 
“Who can unite it?”  
“One who is not fond of killing can unite it,” I said. 
“Who can give it to him?” 
“No one in the Empire will refuse to give it to him. Does Your Majesty not know about 
young rice plants? Should there be a drought in the seventh or eighth month, these plants 
will wilt. If clouds begin to gather in the sky and the rain comes pouring down, then the 
plants will spring up again. This being the case, who can stop it? Now in the Empire 
amongst the shepherds of men there is not one who is not fond of killing. If there is one 
who is not, then the people in the Empire will come crane their necks to watch for his 
coming. This being truly the case, the people will turn to him like water flowing 
downwards with a tremendous force. Who can stop it?”35
The Confucians believed that the sage-king’s virtue – his benevolence and righteousness 
– was sufficient to order the state internally, and bring the whole empire to heel 
                                                 
34 Roger Ames, The Art of Rulership, op. cit., p. 154. 
35 Mencius, trans. D. C. Lau, op. cit., pp. 53-54. 
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externally. Internally, the ruler’s virtue would flow downwards to transform the people, 
thereby establishing order in the state. Externally, enemy soldiers who hear of such a 
benevolent ruler would ineluctably defect from their own armies and submit willingly to 
his rule. In this way, the Confucian ruler would unify the empire without even having to 
resort to war. Han Fei dismissed such thinking as naive and totally irrelevant to his day 
and age. Rather than wait for the rare appearance of a sage-king, Han Fei was convinced 
that any ruler, however mediocre, could unify the empire simply by holding fast to his 
three precepts of government – shi, fa and shu. He recognised that the people would not, 
of their own accord, risk death to fight nor weary themselves in the fields. Yet agriculture 
and warfare were essential to prospering and strengthening the state, thereby putting it in 
a position to subdue weaker states and ultimately unify the empire. Because of the 
people’s short-sightedness, Han Fei believed that the only way to get them to work for 
the benefit of the state, and concomitantly, for their own long-term benefit, was to have 
the ruler wield his position or influence (shi) and make the people conform to his laws or 
standards (fa). As for his rapacious ministers, the ruler would need to use statecraft (shu) 
to employ them. If any one of these three instruments of government were undermined, 
the goal of unifying the empire would be thwarted.  
 It is against this backdrop that we must read the Orwellian-type passages in the 
Han Fei Zi. In “Regulations and Distinctions (制分),” for instance, Han Fei recommends 
a system of mutual surveillance and implication so that the slightest hint of deviance in 
the land will be sniffed out and punished. He writes:  
For this reason, the state at the height of order is able to take the suppression of villainy 
for its duty. Why? Because its law comprehends human nature and accords with the 
principles of government. If so, how to get rid of delicate villainy? By making the people 
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watch one another in their hidden affairs. Then how to make them watch one another? By 
implicating the people of the same hamlet in one another’s crime. When everyone knows 
that the penalty or reward will directly affect him, if the people of the same hamlet fail to 
watch one another, they will fear they may not be able to escape the implication, and 
those who are evil-minded, will not be able to forget so many people [are] watching 
them. Were such the law, everybody would mind his own doings, watch everybody else, 
and disclose the secrets of any culprit. For, whoever denounces a criminal offence, is not 
held guilty but is given a reward; whoever misses any culprit, is definitely censured and 
given the same penalty as the culprit. Were such the law, all types of culprits would be 
detected. If the minutest villainy is not tolerated, it is due to the system of personal 
denunciation and mutual implication.36
It is hard to imagine how any benefit can accrue to the people from living in such an 
oppressive environment, where relatives and neighbours are encouraged to forsake their 
kinship ties and spy on one another to protect their self-interests. The passage above 
brings to mind a chilling episode from Orwell’s disturbing novel, 1984, where one of the 
characters, Parsons – an extremely loyal party cadre who is totally incapable of sedition – 
is reported by his little daughter to the thought-police for sub-consciously uttering anti-
party slogans in his sleep. Surely, we object, a system that encourages children to turn 
against their fathers cannot be one that benefits the people! Yet, such totalitarian control 
was deemed necessary by Han Fei because he believed that any crime left undetected and 
unpunished would gravely undermine the ruler’s fa, since the people would then venture 
to disregard his laws and commands. As a result, the ruler would lose his ability to 
control or use the people, and the task of unification would be well-nigh impossible.   
                                                 
36 Liao, vol. 2, p. 331.   
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It was perhaps inevitable, then, that in the lead-up to unification, everyone worked 
like cogs in a machine, putting their individual talents to work for the benefit of the state. 
It is worth noting that Han Fei, unlike Big Brother in 1984, did not ask the people to 
sacrifice their personal benefit for the sake of the state. The people were certainly not to 
be treated like cogs in a machine, if this means that they were made to work for no 
personal gain. What Han Fei advocated was for the ruler to control the means to securing 
benefit, so that the people would know that the only path to profit lay in conforming to 
the ruler’s fa. He wanted to inculcate in the people the principle that “if you want to 
benefit yourself, benefit your ruler first; if you want to benefit your family, benefit your 
country first.”37 Furthermore, it is possible to read such totalitarian control as an 
expedient measure to solve the immediate problems of disorder and to achieve 
unification. While Han Fei insists that fa is the corollary to Dao in the human realm, he 
also holds that the content of the ruler’s fa changes as circumstances change. In “The 
Five Vermin,” for example, Han Fei writes, “Circumstances change according to the age, 
and ways of dealing with them change with the circumstances.”38 Since the ruler’s laws 
are not static, but are, instead, pegged to the circumstances of the day, it is not 
unreasonable to think that Han Fei would dispense with such totalitarian control when 
peace has been restored to the empire.  
2.2.4 Machiavellian deceit to control ministers  
 While Han Fei stressed that the ruler’s fa must be clear and public, he also taught 
that the ruler’s shu or statecraft must, in contrast, be mysterious and invisible. In 
                                                 
37 “Outer Congeries of Sayings, Lower Right Series,” Liao, vol. 2, p. 127. 
38 Watson, p. 99.  
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“Criticism of the Ancients, Series Three,” for example, Han Fei compares these two 
instruments of government:  
The law (fa) is codified in books, kept in government offices, and promulgated among the 
hundred surnames. The tact (shu) is hidden in the bosom and useful in comparing diverse 
motivating factors of human conduct and in manipulating the body of officials secretly. 
Therefore, law wants nothing more than publicity; tact abhors visibility.39
Here, we learn that the ruler employs shu to manipulate his ministers into divulging their 
hidden thoughts and intentions. This passage is actually written in response to Kuan Tzû, 
who taught the ruler to show signs of liking a minister if he approved of the latter’s 
conduct, and signs of disliking him if the ruler disapproved of him. Kuan Tzû argued that 
if reward and punishment accord with what is seen, then the minister will dare do no 
wrong even in unseen places. In rebuttal, Han Fei argues that if a ruler’s approval and 
disapproval rest on what he observes in public places, then he will never get at the 
realities of things, since even the most wicked minister would labour to put on a 
respectful appearance in public. Instead, the ruler must use his “insight” to “illuminate 
distant crooks,” “discern their hidden secrets and thereby guard against them.”40 In short, 
Han Fei believed that since villainy is rarely displayed visibly in public places, ‘invisible’ 
methods were necessary to flush it out.  
 What special ‘insight’ does the ruler possess to deal with distant crooks and how 
is he to discern their hidden secrets? The Han Fei Zi is replete with examples of what the 
ruler’s arsenal of shu (statecraft) comprises. What is disturbing for critics of Han Fei is 
                                                 
39 Liao, vol. 2, p. 188. 
40 Liao, vol. 2, p. 187. 
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that these tactics often require the ruler to be scheming and deceitful. In “Eight Canons 
(八经),” for example, Han Fei writes: 
Keep the detectives near by the officials and thereby know their inner conditions. Send 
detectives afar and thereby know outer affairs. Hold to your clear knowledge and thereby 
inquire into obscure objects. Give ministers false encouragements and thereby extirpate 
their attempts to infringe on the ruler’s rights. Invert your words and thereby try out the 
suspects. Use contradictory arguments and thereby find out the invisible culprits. 
Establish the system of espionage and thereby rectify the fraudulent people. Make 
appointments and dismissals and thereby observe the reactions of wicked officials. Speak 
explicitly and thereby persuade people to avoid faults. Humbly follow others’ speeches 
and thereby discriminate between earnest men and flatterers. Get information from 
everybody and know things you have not yet seen. Create quarrels among adherents and 
partisans and thereby try to disperse them.41
This passage lists several tactics that Han Fei’s ruler uses to control his ministers. First, 
he sends out spies among the ministers to watch them. Next, as the passage implies, the 
ruler shrouds himself in a mist of secrecy so that the ministers cannot guess at his 
intentions nor know his likes and dislikes. Being ignorant of the ruler’s true intentions 
and feelings, they cannot hope to fool him with false appearances. The ruler remains 
secretive by “inverting his words,” “using contradictory arguments,” appearing “humble” 
so as to detect flatterers, and listening to all alike without favouritism. He also “creates 
quarrels among partisans” in order to prevent powerful cliques from forming among the 
ministers. 
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 In the same chapter, Han Fei also instructs the ruler on how to control more high-
ranking ministers: 
Those [officials] whose posts are high and responsibilities are great, should be held under 
surveillance by three means of control, namely, ‘taking hostages,’ ‘holding securities,’ 
and ‘finding sureties.’ Relatives, wives and sons can be taken as hostages; ranks and 
bounties can be held as securities; and the ‘three units and basic fives’ that are implicated 
in any of the members’ illegal acts, can be found as sureties ... When censuring culprits, 
if name and fact correspond to each other, he should immediately enforce the censure. If 
their life is detrimental to the state affairs and their death penalty is harmful to the ruler’s 
name, then he should poison them through drinking or eating, otherwise send them back 
into the hands of their enemies. This is said to ‘eliminate invisible culprits.’42
These brutal measures seem to reinforce the standard reading of Han Fei as a defender of 
despots. For how can Han Fei claim to be championing the people’s welfare when his 
ruler resorts to taking the innocent hostage, even if this is to prevent treason? 
Furthermore, poisoning a culprit away from the public eye in order to protect the ruler’s 
name chafes at our contemporary belief in the rights of a criminal to a fair and open trial. 
It also seems to accord Han Fei’s ruler unlimited powers to remove any thorn in his flesh 
without any one else ever coming to know of it. Yet, before we write Han Fei off as an 
advocate of tyranny, it is interesting to note that present-day Britain has just unveiled a 
proposal for a tough anti-terror Bill which gives the Home Secretary “the potential to put 
foreign and domestic terrorist suspects under indefinite house arrest on his sole 
authority.” Presenting this Bill before Parliament, the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke 
argued that “the exceptional powers are justified because Britain faces unprecedented 
                                                 
42 Liao, vol. 2, pp. 262-263. 
 60
threats.”43 If the spectre of terrorism is sufficient to warrant such extreme measures from 
a country which prides itself on being the flagship of democracy in Europe, then perhaps 
it is not surprising that, given the more precarious times that Han Fei lived in, the ruler 
needed such “exceptional powers” to order the state. 
 We could argue that Han Fei’s shu, deceitful as it might be, benefits the masses 
because often, it is the ministers who exploit and oppress the people. Han Fei’s reason, 
then, for adopting a heavy-handed approach to the ministers would be to prevent them 
from harming the people. Ultimately, I think the underlying reason for Han Fei’s 
recommendation of such Machiavellian tactics is his conviction that ministers and rulers 
have differing interests (臣主异利). Han Fei had a drastically low opinion of ministers. 
As the title of one of his chapters suggests, he believed that most ministers were apt to 
betray, molest, or murder the ruler.44 In this chapter, Han Fei analyses the governments of 
Kuan Chung and Lord Shang and comes to the following conclusion: 
From such a viewpoint, I can see that the sage in governing the state pursues the policy of 
making the people inevitably do him good but never relies on their doing him good with 
love ... To be sure, ruler and minister have no blood kinship, if able to seek safety [or 
profit]45 by following the right and straight way, the minister will apply all his strength to 
serve the sovereign; if unable to seek safety by following the right and straight way, he 
will practice selfishness (xing si: 行私) and thereby violate the superior.46
Han Fei believed that all men alike are driven by profit. In this regard, the ministers of his 
day were no different to the ordinary man in the street. However, because of their 
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proximity to the ruler, ministers, of all the people, had the unique opportunity to 
manipulate or even murder the ruler for personal gain. Since there are no kinship ties to 
hold the ministers under obligation to the ruler, if they can profit by following the ruler’s 
laws, they will do so. Otherwise, they will not hesitate to use their private (si) means to 
profit at the ruler’s expense. Hence, Han Fei urged the ruler not to rely on his ministers 
doing him good out of love, but to rely instead on their being unable to betray him.  
 Han Fei’s clear-sighted understanding of man’s profit-mindedness convinces him 
that the interests of the ruler and ministers are fundamentally opposed. Put another way, it 
is a zero-sum struggle between the two – what is in the interests of the ministers will 
necessarily be harmful to the ruler. This is evident in the following passage from “Inner 
Congeries of Sayings, The Lower Series:” 
Ruler and minister differ in interest. Therefore, ministers are never loyal. As soon as the 
minister’s interest stands up, the sovereign’s interest goes to ruin. Thus wicked ministers 
would exterminate their opponents at home by sending for enemy troops and bewilder 
their lord by enumerating foreign affairs. As long as their private interest is 
accomplished, they never mind any disaster to the state.47
Because their interests differ, ministers can never be loyal. As such, unless the ruler 
makes it unprofitable for them to do so, they will definitely seek to profit by collaborating 
with the enemy to undermine their rulers. Han Fei laboured to drive home the principle 
that rulers and ministers have antithetical or mutually incompatible interests because he 
had learnt from history that most accounts of regicide happened as a result of the ruler 
naively trusting his ministers. It is only by grasping this principle, then, that any ruler 
could hope to unify the empire. In “Eight Canons,” Han Fei writes: 
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Who knows ruler and minister differ in interest, will become supreme. Who regards the 
difference as identity, will be intimidated. Who administers the state affairs in common 
with his ministers, will be killed. Therefore, the intelligent sovereign will scrutinise the 
distinctions between public and private interests and the relative positions of benefit and 
harm, so that wicked men will find no chance to act.48
 What is interesting to note from these passages is that the minister’s interests are 
seen as “private interests,” and associated with wickedness and harm, whereas the ruler’s 
interests are identified with “public interests” and associated with benefit to the state. We 
see more evidence for this in this passage from “Having Regulations:” 
[Previously strong states] all fell into decay, because their ministers and magistrates all 
followed the path to chaos and never sought for the way to order ... Therefore, at present, 
any ruler able to expel private crookedness (去私曲) and uphold public law (就公法), 
finds the people safe and the state in order; and any ruler able to expunge private action 
and act on public law, finds his army strong and his enemy weak.49
Again, we see that it is the “private crookedness” of ministers that has brought about the 
ruin of previously strong states. Therefore, to order the state and make the people safe, 
the ruler must uphold public law and stop the ministers from furthering their private gain 
at the expense of the ruler, the state and the people. As this next passage tells us, the ruler 
must eradicate the selfish or private motives of his ministers and reinforce their sense of 
public justice:  
Every minister cherishes both selfish motive (私心) and public justice (公义). To refine 
his personality, improve his integrity, practice public creeds, and behave unselfish in 
office, is the public justice of the minister. To corrupt his conduct, follow his desires, 
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secure his personal interests, and benefit his own family, is the selfish motive of the 
minister. If the intelligent sovereign is on the Throne, every minister will discard his 
selfish motive and practice public justice. If the violent sovereign (乱君: or sovereign 
given to disorder) is on the Throne, every minister will cast public justice aside and act 
on his selfish motive. Thus ruler and minister have different frames of mind 
(臣主异心).50 [The ruler tames the ministers by (appealing to) their calculating mind, and 
ministers serve the ruler with a calculating mind. The relationship between ruler and 
minister is based on calculation. To injure himself and benefit the state, the minister will 
not do it; to prosper the state and benefit the minister, the ruler will not do it. To the 
minister, there is no benefit in injuring himself; to the ruler, by thus injuring the state, he 
undermines his relationship with the people. Ruler and minister thus work together on the 
principle of calculation.]51
Not only do ministers and rulers have different interests, this passage reveals that they 
also have, literally, different minds. Left to their own devices, ministers would “follow 
their desires, secure their personal interests and benefit their families” without regard for 
the state or ruler. The only way to make them discard their selfish motives and uphold 
public justice is if the ruler makes it profitable for them to do so. Han Fei dismisses out of 
hand any romantic ideas of altruistic ministers and avers that ministers, like all men, work 
for the ruler purely on the principle of calculation. Contrary to what the Confucians 
believed then, there is no special bond between ruler and minister; they relate solely on 
the basis of calculation. As such, the ruler must make it unprofitable for them to act on 
their private motives and profitable for them to serve the public interest. 
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 In summary, then, the reason why Han Fei recommends such seemingly 
underhand and deceitful methods of control is because he believes that these secret or 
invisible methods are required to flush out hidden villainies. Han Fei was convinced that 
ministers and rulers have antithetical interests, and therefore, most, if not all, the 
ministers were secretly harbouring a plot to harm their ruler. Since they would not be 
wearing these evil intentions on their sleeves, the ruler had to resort to invisible methods 
to prevent his own ruin and thereby ensure stability in the state. 
2.2.5  Han Fei’s renunciation of conventional morality  
 Critics see Han Fei’s rejection of all conventional moral values as the surest proof 
that he is primarily interested in “government for the ruler.” Watson writes, “Unlike 
Confucianism and Mohism, [Legalism] made no attempt to preserve or restore the 
customs and moral values of the past; indeed it professed to have no use for morality 
whatsoever ... [Legalism’s] only goal was to teach the ruler, in what it regarded as 
hardheaded and practical terms, how to survive and prosper in the world of the present.”52
Indeed, it is hard to see how any ruler who renounces typically Confucian moral virtues 
like benevolence and righteousness, and opts instead for harsh and severe penalties 
coupled with merciless techniques of control, can genuinely claim to be benefiting the 
people.   
The Han Fei Zi abounds with diatribes against the Confucians and their moral 
values. In “Ministers Apt to Betray, Molest, or Murder Ruler,” Han Fei berates those 
present-day scholars who call on rulers to “practice nothing but benevolence, 
righteousness, favour, and love (仁义惠爱).”53 He believed that adopting such a policy 
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had led to rulers ruining their states and losing their lives in serious cases, and in minor 
ones, seeing their territory dismembered and their ranks relegated. He explains the reason 
for such an assessment: 
Indeed, to give alms to the poor and destitute is what the world calls a benevolent and 
righteous act; to take pity on the hundred surnames and hesitate to inflict censure and 
punishment on culprits is what the world calls an act of favour and love. To be sure, 
when the ruler gives alms to the poor and destitute, men of no merit will also be 
rewarded; when he hesitates to inflict censure and punishment upon culprits, then ruffians 
will never be suppressed. If men of no merit in the country are rewarded, the people will 
neither face enemies nor cut heads off on the battlefield nor will they devote their 
strength to farming and working at home...54
Han Fei believed that granting criminals amnesty would embolden criminals and doling 
out rewards to the undeserving would discourage the people from the hard tasks that were 
essential to the strengthening of the state. Interestingly, this debate between Han Fei and 
the Confucians about “giving alms to the poor” is, at this time of writing, being played 
out in the local budget debate. Responding to the opposition’s call for a “financial 
guarantee” for the poor, Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, warned that “the 
pressure to dole out ever more help to needy Singaporeans is very real and constant. But 
the Government must never yield unthinkingly, even a small step, lest it slides down the 
slippery slope to breed an ‘entitlement mentality’ among Singaporeans.”55 Like PM Lee, 
Han Fei feared that this so-called ‘benevolent and righteous’ practice of doling out 
rewards to those who have not achieved merit would, in the long term, erode the people’s 
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work ethic and cause them to avoid those loathsome tasks that were central to the 
preservation and strengthening of the state. It is noteworthy that while Han Fei denounces 
the Confucian practice of doling out rewards to the undeserving, he is not against 
providing for those who cannot provide for themselves. In “Eminence in Learning 
(显学),” Han Fei writes:  
Now if men start out with equal opportunities and yet there are a few who, without the 
help of unusually good harvests or outside income, are able to keep themselves well 
supplied, it must be either due to hard work or to frugal living. If men start out with equal 
opportunities and yet there are a few who, without having suffered from some calamity 
like famine or sickness, still sink into poverty and destitution, it must be due either to 
laziness or to extravagant living. The lazy and extravagant grow poor; the diligent and 
frugal get rich. Now if the ruler levies money from the rich in order to give alms to the 
poor, he is robbing the diligent and frugal and indulging the lazy and extravagant. If he 
expects such means to induce the people to work industriously and spend with caution, he 
will be disappointed.56 [Italics mine] 
From this passage, it is clear that what Han Fei wants to avoid is benefiting those who are 
poor as a result of their “laziness” or “extravagant living.” He is not opposed to helping 
people who are stricken by some external cause over which they have no control, like 
“famine or sickness.”  
 “The Five Vermin” contains Han Fei’s main arguments for his renunciation of 
conventional morality. Han Fei avers at the start of the chapter that all men are driven by 
profit. Hence, the reason why men of ancient times made light of material goods was not 
because they were benevolent, but because there was a surplus of goods then. 
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Conversely, it is because goods today are scarce that men quarrel and snatch, and not 
because they are particularly vicious. In contrast to other chapters where Han Fei 
denounces the ambition and rapacity of villainous ministers, here, he clinically analyses 
their behaviour, and concludes that “when men strive for sinecures in the government, it 
is not because they are base, but because the power they will receive is great.”57 This 
reflection on man’s profit-seeking nature thus leads him to formulate the following 
principle of government: 
When the sage rules, he takes into consideration the quantity of things and deliberates on 
scarcity and plenty. Though his punishments may be light, this is not due to his 
compassion; though his penalties may be severe, this is not because he is cruel; he simply 
follows the custom appropriate to the time. Circumstances change according to the age, 
and ways of dealing with them change with the circumstances.58  
Han Fei’s main argument against the Confucians is that although “benevolence and 
righteousness served for ancient times, [they] no longer serve today.”59 Because of the 
scarcity of goods, his age was one of rampant disorder, “quarrelling and snatching.” In 
such a critical age, “to try to use the ways of a generous and lenient government to rule 
the people ... is like trying to drive a runaway horse without using reins or whip.”60 Han 
Fei gives two reasons why such government by love does not work. First, rulers surely 
cannot love the people more than parents love their children. If even parents, then, cannot 
prevent their children from becoming unruly by their love, how can rulers expect to bring 
the people to order by their lesser love! Second, Han Fei believes that “the people will 
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bow naturally to authority (shi), but few of them can be moved by righteousness.”61 He 
justifies this by pointing to no less than Confucius himself. Although Confucius was the 
very paragon of benevolence and righteousness, he only managed to get seventy men to 
be his disciples. In contrast, Duke Ai of Lu was a mediocre ruler, yet even Confucius had 
to bow to him in virtue of his authority. Therefore, the certain way to success is for the 
ruler to wield his authority and not, as the Confucians insist, to aspire to the benevolence 
and righteousness of Confucius.  
As opposed to love, which is not enough to make children learn what is right, the 
law backed by severe penalties never fails to fill people with terror and cause them to 
reform their conduct and change their ways.62 Han Fei describes what to him is the only 
government appropriate for his times: 
[In the light of people’s profit-mindedness] the best rewards are those which are generous 
and predictable, so that the people may profit by them. The best penalties are those which 
are severe and inescapable, so that the people will fear them. The best laws are those 
which are uniform and inflexible, so that the people can understand them. Therefore the 
ruler should never delay in handing out rewards, nor be merciful in administering 
punishment. If praise accompanies the reward, and censure follows on the heels of 
punishment, then worthy and unworthy men alike will put forth their best efforts.63
However, the foolish rulers of his day confuse the law by censuring or praising those 
things which are completely at odds with those which they reward or punish. For 
example, instead of punishing the man who makes certain to avenge any wrong to his 
brother, the ruler calls him an “upright (廉)” man. Again, although the man who joins his 
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friend in attacking the perpetrator of an insult violates the law, the ruler deems him an 
“honourable (贞)” man. Hence, the people disregard the law and outdo each other in 
shows of valour, and the ruler ends up losing control of them. Another reason, then, for 
Han Fei’s renunciation of such conventional virtues as ‘benevolence,’ ‘righteousness,’ 
‘uprightness’ and ‘honour’ is that these so-called ‘virtues’ confuse the ruler’s standards. 
 Furthermore, the reason why such moral virtues are not upheld by the law is 
because they are either of no use to the state, or worse, they are detrimental to the 
interests of the state. Han Fei cites as an example the man of Lu who fled battle thrice to 
care for his aged father. Although this man was a filial (孝) son to his father, his filial 
piety came at the cost of betraying his sovereign. As Han Fei writes, “The nation at peace 
may patronise Confucian scholars and cavaliers; but the nation in danger must call upon 
its fighting men.”64 Filial piety might be the highest goal of the private individual, but in 
this case, it is completely at odds with the interests and goals of the state. If the ruler were 
to act like Confucius did and reward such a man with a post in government, then no one 
would risk their lives in battle to defend the state’s altars, since an easier and much more 
attractive route to attaining eminence and reward is available. 
 In sum, Han Fei argues that conventional morality is impotent to cure the disorder 
of the day. He also insists that the ruler’s harshness or ‘benevolence’ is not a function of 
his love for the people – his ‘cruelty’ or ‘compassion’ toward them – but is rather a 
function of the times. Because a critical age necessitates such harsh measures, the ruler 
who wants to benefit the people must discard the easy way of love and implement the 
difficult way of law and tact. Han Fei writes in “Six Contrarieties:” 
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Indeed, opening boils causes pain; taking drugs causes bitter taste. Yet if boils are not 
opened on account of pain and drugs not taken on account of bitterness, the person will 
not live and the disease will not stop.65
Although going under the surgical knife causes pain, we endure the pain in order to 
eradicate the disease and thereby live. In the same way, although Han Fei’s severe 
political programme causes the people pain, the wise ruler will implement it steadfastly 
so that order can eventually be restored in the state.  
We see then that there are two distinct senses of “ren (仁)” in the Han Fei Zi: ren 
motivations and ren methods. D. C. Lau’s following comment, I think, illuminates the 
difference between these two senses of ren: 
Thus Mencius’ ideal of a state can be summed up by the term ‘benevolent government’. 
So long as the ruler is motivated by benevolence, the people will understand and accept 
whatever measure he finds it necessary to take. “If the services of the people were used 
with a view to sparing them hardship, they would not complain even when hard driven. If 
people were put to death in pursuance of a policy to keep them alive, they would die 
bearing no ill-will towards the man who put them to death (VIIA12).” 66 [Italics mine] 
According to Lau, Mencius’ theory of benevolent government focuses on the ruler having 
ren motivations, and not necessarily on him using ren methods. In other words, 
regardless of his actual measures (which might even include putting the people to death), 
a ruler can be said to practice benevolent government as long as he is “motivated by 
benevolence.” This distinction between ren motivations and ren methods is essential in 
helping us understand the crux of Han Fei’s disagreement with the Confucians. While he 
criticises the latter, for instance, the doling out of rewards to the undeserving, Han Fei 
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does not proscribe the former. In fact, in the passages we have examined, Han Fei insists 
that it is benevolence, or a love for the people, that motivates his extremely severe 
Legalist programme. Han Fei’s public renunciation of conventional morality, then, 
should not be seen as evidence that he espouses government for the ruler.   
2.2.6 Han Fei’s perfectly just state 
  It is striking that although Han Fei’s political system is extremely severe, even 
brutal, because it is also utterly fair and just, he believes that the system will not provoke 
resentment amongst the people. Han Fei holds his system up as the model of a “perfectly 
just state,” where everyone gets no more and no less than what he exactly deserves, 
according to the law. Once the law has been ingrained in the minds of the people, they 
will feel no resentment against the ruler when punished for a transgression, and 
conversely, no gratitude to the ruler when rewarded for some merit. In the “Outer 
Congeries of Sayings, the Lower Left Series,” Han Fei quotes the canon: “Censured for a 
crime, nobody feels bitter against the superior.”67 He gives as an example the man who 
had his feet cut off by Tzŭ-kao, who was the judge of a criminal court when Confucius 
was Premier of Wei. When the Ruler of Wei wanted to arrest Confucius and his disciples, 
including Tzŭ-kao, on the grounds of plotting a disturbance, the footless man hid Tzŭ-kao 
from the authorities when he had the chance to turn the latter in. Tzŭ-kao was surprised 
and asked him why he did not take up this opportunity for revenge. In reply the footless 
man said: 
I had my feet cut off as my crime deserved the punishment. Nothing could be done about 
it. Nevertheless, when Your Excellency was about to decide on the case against thy 
servant, Your Excellency interpreted the ordinance in all possible ways and supplied 
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words either before or after thy servant’s pleas, being so anxious to hold thy servant 
innocent, which thy servant understood very well. When the case was settled and the 
sentence was passed, Your Excellency in excess of pity felt unpleasant as expressed in 
the facial colour, which thy servant saw and also understood. That was not because of 
Your Excellency’s private favour to thy servant but because of his inborn nature and 
benevolent heart (仁心). This is the reason why I have felt so pleased and grateful to 
Your Excellency.68
We see again in this passage that for Han Fei, a benevolent heart is not incompatible with 
harsh rule. Because the footless man understood that his crime deserved punishment, he 
felt no resentment against Tzŭ-kao for upholding public justice and sentencing him to 
have his feet cut off. Instead, he felt nothing but gratitude to the latter because he saw 
how it pained Tzŭ-kao to have had to pass the sentence.69  
 Critics of Han Fei accuse him of granting the ruler excessive powers because as 
the creator of the law, the ruler is above the law and need not abide by it. Fu Zhengyuan, 
for example, writes: “These ancient Legalists proposed that the political action of the 
ruler should not be constrained by moral concerns and that the political power of the state 
must never be restricted by law.”70 While it is true that Han Fei’s ruler is the author of the 
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law, it is also clear that the ruler is bound by his own standards of public justice, and 
cannot use the law arbitrarily for private gain.  
 In the Han Fei Zi, we see many examples of the ruler having to punish the people 
or his ministers for violations of the law, even though their actions are in fact in the 
ruler’s own private interests. In “The Two Handles (二柄),” Han Fei recounts the story of 
how the keeper of the royal hat was punished for overstepping his duties when he 
covered the marquis with a robe upon seeing that the latter was cold. Explaining why the 
marquis ordered his punishment, Han Fei writes: “It was not that he did not dislike the 
cold, but he considered the trespass of one official upon the duties of another to be a 
greater danger than cold.”71 Surely, it was not in the personal interests of the marquis to 
punish the keeper of the royal hat, since the latter was only acting to prevent him from 
catching a chill. However, in order not to undermine his public system of law and 
accountability, the marquis had no choice but to mete out the due punishment. 
 A more extreme example of the ruler’s public-spiritedness is recorded in “Outer 
Congeries of Sayings, Lower Right Series.” Here we read of King Chao of Ch‘in, who 
punished the people for the heinous crime of praying for his own early recovery from 
illness! The King explained his action as follows: 
To be sure, who with no order offers prayers at his pleasure, loves me, the King. Indeed, 
when the people love me, I will have to alter the law and bend my will to comply with 
their requests. In this manner, the law will not stand. If the law does not stand, it leads to 
chaos and ruin. Thus, the best measure is to fine the people of every village two suits of 
armour and restore them to order.72
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King Chao forsook his personal benefit to ensure that the people served him on the basis 
of his position and not on the basis of love. Only by so doing could he make the law stand 
and thus prevent chaos and ruin from befalling the people.  
As Schwartz writes, then, the Legalist ruler “must be anything but an arbitrary 
despot, if one means by a despot a tyrant who follows all his impulses, whims, and 
passions. Once the systems which maintain the entire structure are in place, he must not 
interfere with their operation. He may use the entire system as a means to the 
achievement of his national and international ambitions, but to do so he must not disrupt 
its impersonal workings.”73 In Han Fei’s perfectly just state, the people rejoice in the 
predictability of the law without fear of arbitrary punishments. It is precisely because of 
this element of predictability that the people feel no resentment toward the ruler even 
when they are severely punished for a crime.  
Someone would object, surely the grossest injustices against humanity could be 
perpetrated in a perfectly just manner. If all we mean by “justice” is that people get 
exactly what they deserve according to the law, then under a wicked regime with wicked 
laws, it might very well be “just” to gas an entire race of people since this is simply what 
the law stipulates that they deserve. Similarly, although Han Fei’s ruler cannot use the 
law arbitrarily for personal gain, he is given inordinate powers to create an entire system 
that works solely for his personal gain.  
What we have seen throughout this chapter, however, is that there is a deeper 
sense of ‘justice’ that is operative in the Han Fei Zi. In Han Fei’s scheme, the ruler 
cannot use the law, even non-arbitrarily, for personal gain because he is fundamentally 
constrained by a commitment to li min. He cannot justify his laws by the mere fact that 
                                                 
73 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, op. cit., p. 345. 
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they are his laws; he must justify them in terms of whether they benefit the people. In 
“Eminence in Learning,” for example, Han Fei labours to justify his harsh measures:  
[The people are like the little child who yells and screams incessantly when it is having 
its head shaved or its boil lanced.] [They do] not understand that the little pain it suffers 
now will bring great benefit later. Now the ruler presses the people to till the land and 
open up new pastures so as to increase their means of livelihood, and yet they consider 
him harsh, he draws up a penal code and makes the punishments more severe in order to 
put a stop to evil, yet the people consider him stern. He levies taxes in cash and grain in 
order to fill the coffers and granaries so that there will be food for the starving and funds 
for the army, and yet the people consider him avaricious. He makes certain that everyone 
within his borders understands warfare and sees to it that there are no private exemptions 
from military service; he unites the strength of the state and fights fiercely in order to take 
its enemies captive, and yet the people consider him violent. These four types of 
undertaking all insure order and safety to the state, and yet the people do not have sense 
to rejoice in them.74
Regardless, then, of whether or not we think his policies do in fact benefit the people, 
they are justified in precisely these terms. But again, the objection surely remains: how 
do we know that this is not Han Fei’s ploy to convince his detractors? The answer, 
unfortunately, is that we cannot know for sure. There is some kind of circularity involved 
when we try to ascertain Han Fei’s motives from what he says they are. The problem 
with Han Fei’s scheme is that there are no mechanisms in place to hold the ruler 
accountable to his claims. However, in view of the reasons that Han Fei gives for his 
measures, unless we decide to read him with more cynicism than we usually reserve for 
                                                 
74 Watson, pp. 128-129. Refer to footnote 68. 
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other writers, it is difficult to see him as the defender of despots that the traditional 
account paints him out to be.   
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have highlighted the main reasons for thinking that Han Fei 
espouses “government for the ruler,” and tried to show that his underlying concern is in 
fact to benefit the people. He recommends severe penalties for small crimes to deter 
profit-minded people from even venturing to commit crime. In this way, they would 
escape punishment altogether. He advises the ruler to purge the government of dissenters 
and establish totalitarian control over the state so that his fa and shi would not be 
undermined, and he can then harness the people’s abilities and energies to strengthen the 
state and ultimately unify the empire. Han Fei also teaches the ruler to use deceitful 
methods to control his ministers because he is convinced that ministers and rulers have 
antithetical interests. Since ministers harbour secret but sure plots to profit at the expense 
of the ruler and the people, the ruler must flush out such villainy using invisible means. 
And finally, the reason why Han Fei denounces conventional morality is because 
extolling such virtues would confuse the ruler’s standards, and furthermore, these virtues 
are impotent to cure the prevailing disorder. So although the Han Fei Zi initially reads as 
a treatise for the despot, it turns out that Han Fei is, in substance if not in form, a closet 
Confucian, since he shares their fundamental belief that government is for the people.  
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Chapter Three: Han Fei’s blueprint for the perfect state  
 
 In the previous two chapters, we explored the relationship between law and 
morality in the Han Fei Zi with an eye to answer the question: Is Han Fei the defender of 
despots that critics claim he is? For as long as this standard account of Han Fei continues 
to hold sway, we will never seriously consider him as a legitimate and valuable voice in 
the perennial debate on what good government is and how it can be achieved. Now that 
we have established in Chapter Two that Han Fei is not an apologist for tyranny, we can 
finally begin, in this concluding chapter, to evaluate Han Fei’s claim that his is the best 
government for his day. Before we can attempt such an evaluation, however, we need to 
first piece together Han Fei’s blueprint for government, which we only caught a glimpse 
of in the earlier chapters. I will thus begin this chapter with a systematic presentation of 
his political vision, starting from the basic assumption underlying this vision. Thereafter, 
I will evaluate the viability of Han Fei’s proposal for good government.  
3.1 Han Fei’s theory of human nature  
 All political theories derive from some theory of human nature. As Madison 
wrote, “What is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?”1 
In order to understand Han Fei’s vision for government, then, it is inevitable that we first 
look to his conception of man.  
 It is interesting that, given its importance, the topic of human nature receives such 
scant attention from Han Fei. Unlike his teacher, Xunzi, who wrote an entire essay 
elaborating his thesis that human nature is bad (性恶), Han Fei asserts this almost matter-
of-factly. The rampant disorder of his day was, perhaps, more than sufficient proof for 
                                                 
1 Federalist Papers No. 51, Rossiter, 1961, p. 322. Quoted in Steven Pinker’s The Blank Slate, Penguin 
Books, 2002, p. 296.  
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him of this thesis. Given that he does not make a systematic case for his theory of human 
nature, I suggest that one way of making this explicit is by looking at what Xunzi says on 
the topic, since Han Fei clearly inherits the latter’s belief that man is by nature bad.  
It is important to understand exactly what Xunzi, and by extension, Han Fei, 
means by the theory that human nature is “bad.” They certainly do not have in mind the 
Christian notion of “original sin;” that man is born with a penchant for evil or malevolent 
acts. Xunzi believes that human nature is bad because “the nature of man is such that he 
is born with a love of profit,” and if each person were to follow his inborn nature (性) and 
indulge his natural inclinations (情), “aggressiveness and greed are certain to develop.”2 
Xunzi denies Mencius’ theory that there are incipient tendencies within the heart-mind 
which, if developed, would set one on the path to sagehood. He states unequivocally that 
“man assuredly does not possess ritual principles and precepts of morality as part of his 
inborn nature; therefore he must study very hard when seeking them.”3 By insisting that 
ritual principles and moral duty are creations of the sages and not anything deriving from 
man’s original constitution, Xunzi has to bite the bullet and admit the difficulty involved 
in a person’s self-cultivation; one needs to “study very hard” under the transforming 
influence of a teacher and model before he can live according to the dictates of ritual and 
morality. Moreover, because self-cultivation involves such a long and arduous process of 
learning and conscious exertion (伪), Xunzi concedes that very few people can in fact 
attain sagehood. He makes a distinction between what is possible (可) for man to achieve 
and his actual capacity (能) to achieve it: 
                                                 
2 “Man’s Nature is Evil” in Xunzi, trans. John Knoblock, Stanford University Press, 1988, 23.1a, p. 150. 
3 Ibid., 23.2b, p. 155. 
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Thus, although it is true that it is possible for the man in the street to become a Yu, that 
the man in the street has the real capacity to become a Yu is not necessarily so. Even 
though one is unable to become a Yu, this does not contradict the possibility of him 
becoming a Yu.4
Although Xunzi agrees with the early Confucians that all men are capable of becoming a 
sage, he stands out from them with his realism. He acknowledges that the theoretical 
possibility notwithstanding, it is practically impossible for the majority of mankind to 
attain the Confucian ethical ideal of sagehood. 
 This point was certainly not lost on Han Fei, who carried Xunzi’s theory of 
human nature even further, arguing not only that human nature is bad, but that it is 
incapable of good. According to Han Fei, “to try to teach people to be benevolent and 
righteous is the same as saying you can make them wise and long-lived;” it is 
impossible.5 As such, it is futile for the ruler to try to cure the age through education, in 
the hope of thereby transforming the people. He must instead follow the way of certain 
success and devote himself to law and not virtue.6 David Wong makes an interesting 
comparison between Xunzi and Hobbes’ solutions to the badness or egoism of human 
nature, which I think is illuminating in showing up where Han Fei parts with Xunzi. 
Wong suggests that Xunzi’s solution is an advance on Hobbes’ because on Xunzi’s 
theory, human beings recognise the need not only to restrain their search for satisfaction 
of desire but also, positively, to transform their very characters through ritual. Hobbes’ 
egoistic psychology, on the other hand, “allows the internalisation of no standards other 
                                                 
4 Xunzi, trans. Knoblock, 23.5b, p. 159. 
5 “Eminence in Learning,” Watson, pp. 126-127. 
6 Watson, p. 125. 
 80
than that of direct concern with individual preservation and contentment.” 7 With egoistic 
individuals, there must be a self-interested reason for them to comply with, and 
furthermore, not cheat on the rules that curb the pursuit of desire. It is left for the state, 
then, as the enforcer of rules, to create a risk of punishment that makes it irrational for 
any individual to try to cheat. 
   For all its merits, I think that Wong’s comparison is ultimately a moot one 
because the fact that Xunzi has the better solution on paper really boils down to his being 
more optimistic about the effects of education on man. Xunzi’s solution to the badness of 
human nature was simply not open to either Hobbes or Han Fei, who did not share his 
confidence that man’s egoistic nature could be transformed. What is more striking from 
Wong’s paper is how similar Han Fei’s account of man is to the Hobbesian account of the 
rational, self-interested individual. Han Fei, like Hobbes, believes that man is essentially 
self-interested and profit-minded, and will not comply with any standards other than 
those that directly concern his “individual preservation and contentment.” Moreover, man 
is “rational” insofar as he makes decisions that maximise his self-interest. In “Ministers 
Apt to Betray, Molest, or Murder Ruler,” Han Fei writes: 
Indeed, to choose safety and profit and leave danger and trouble, this is human nature 
(人之情). Now, if men who, being ministers to a ruler, apply their forces to accomplish 
their merits and exert their wisdom to express their spirit of loyalty, eventually plunge 
themselves into misery, incline their families towards poverty, and entangle their fathers 
and sons in their own troubles, and if those who delude the sovereign for the sake of 
wicked profits and serve nobles and vassals with bribes of cash and commodities, always 
glorify themselves, enrich their families, and benefit their fathers and sons, then how can 
                                                 
7 David B. Wong, “Xunzi on moral motivation,” in Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, ed. T.C. 
Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe, Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, p. 121. 
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people leave the way to safety and profit and choose the place of danger and trouble? 
Should there be such a fault in the government of the state, it is clear that it would be 
impossible for the superior to expect the inferior to do no wickedness and the magistrates 
to uphold the law.8  
Here, Han Fei argues that government must be based upon the natural inclinations of man 
(人之情), which is “to choose safety and profit and leave danger and trouble.” Since man 
will pursue whichever course of action best promotes his self-interest, regardless of 
whether this involves loyalty to the ruler or betraying him, the ruler must ensure that it is 
profitable for the ministers to serve him and harmful for them to delude and betray him.  
 What makes rational, self-interested man amenable to the ruler’s control is his 
love for reward and his fear of punishment.  In the same chapter, Han Fei continues:  
Indeed, severe penalty is what the people fear, heavy punishment is what the people hate. 
Accordingly, the wise man promulgates what they fear in order to forbid the practice of 
wickedness and establishes what they hate in order to prevent villainous acts... Whoever 
has them [law and tact, reward and punishment] in his grip will eventually accomplish his 
purpose.9
In “Inner Congeries of Sayings, Upper Series,” Han Fei describes the other basic human 
motivation – man’s love for reward: 
If reward and honour are great and of faith, the inferior will make light of death. The 
saying is based on Viscount Wên’s saying that, “The inferior turns to reward and high 
honour just like the wild deer going to luxuriant grass.”10
Because man essentially loves reward and hates punishment, the ruler simply needs to 
control the sources of reward and punishment to be able to make man conform to his fa. 
                                                 
8 Liao, vol. 1, p. 118. 
9 “Ministers Apt to Betray, Molest, or Murder Ruler,” Liao, vol. 1, pp. 128-129.  
10 Liao, vol. 1, p. 283. 
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The ruler makes it known that the only way for people to satisfy their love for profit, and 
conversely, to avoid harm and punishment is by such conformity. In “Outer Congeries of 
Sayings, Upper Left Series,” Han Fei writes: 
Wherever lies profit, there people go; wherever fame is offered, there officers die. 
Therefore, if any meritorious service goes beyond the limits of the law and reward is 
bestowed therefore, then the superior cannot gain any profit from the inferior; if fame 
goes beyond the limits of the law and honour accompanies it, then officers will strive 
after their own fame but never will cultivate any fame for the ruler.11
In this passage, Han Fei again makes the observation that people will always go where 
profit lies. Although all men naturally shudder at the prospect of death, officers will risk 
life and limb to cut off enemies’ heads in the battlefield if this is the sole means by which 
they can attain fame. Han Fei is convinced that man’s love for profit need not be, as it 
was for Xunzi, a problem for government. By strictly upholding his fa as the single route 
to profit, the ruler can in fact exploit man’s “badness” to his advantage, and ensure that in 
their pursuit of profit, the people ultimately benefit him, and concomitantly, the state. 
Han Fei thus warns the ruler against confusing his fa by rewarding and honouring men 
whose deeds are not deemed worthy by it, since this would encourage the people to 
disregard his fa and seek alternative means of profit.  
Han Fei takes this behaviourist model of the self to its furthest extreme and argues 
that simply by exploiting his two handles of reward and punishment, the ruler can make 
the people take on whatever traits or attributes that his fa requires. He gives many 
examples of the malleability of human behaviour in “Inner Congeries of Sayings, Upper 
Series.” One example he gives is of Li K‘uei, who, as Governor of the Upper Land under 
                                                 
11 Liao, vol. 2, p. 29. 
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Marquis Wên of Wey, wanted every man to shoot well. He thus issued an order decreeing 
that legal disputes in the land be settled by an archery contest; those who hit the target 
would win the suit and those who missed it would lose the suit. The result of this decree 
was that “everybody started to practice archery day and night and never stopped. When 
they came to war with the Ch‘ins, they imposed a crushing defeat upon the enemy 
inasmuch as every one of them was a good archer.”12 Underlying Han Fei’s concept of fa, 
then, is his belief that man is primarily motivated by a love for profit and a fear of 
punishment. Therefore, by controlling the means to profit and wielding the exclusive 
right to inflict punishment, the ruler can dictate human behaviour and put the people to 
work in service of state goals.  
Man’s love for profit is also such that he makes “rational” decisions on the basis 
of profit calculations. Man’s “rational” nature is precisely what inspires Han Fei’s policy 
of “abolishing penalties by means of penalties.” He believes that laying down severe 
penalties would prevent the people from committing crime altogether because he sees 
crime as inherently rational: people rob and kill because that is where the money is. 
Therefore, the most effective way to prevent crime is to strike directly at people’s rational 
incentives – by making the anticipated cost of crime so high that it outstrips the potential 
benefits to the person of committing the crime.  
It is important to understand the extent of Han Fei’s belief that man is essentially 
self-interested. Han Fei thinks that even the parent-child relationship, which is probably 
the most intimate of all interpersonal relationships, is characterised by self-interest. He 
writes in “Six Contrarieties:” 
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Now the relationship between superior and inferior involves no affection of father and 
son, if anyone wishes to rule the inferiors by practising righteousness, the relationship 
will certainly have cracks. Besides, parents in relation to children, when males are born, 
congratulate each other, and, when females are born, lessen the care of them. Equally 
coming out from the bosoms and lapels of the parents, why should boys receive 
congratulations while girls are ill-treated? Because parents consider their future 
conveniences and calculate their permanent benefits. Thus even parents in relation to 
their children use the calculating mind (计算之心) in treating them, how much more 
should those who have no affection of parent and child?13
By appealing to the common perception that sons are more valuable than daughters, Han 
Fei argues that the affection parents have for their children is ultimately based upon their 
calculated self-interest. As Han Fei sees it, how parents treat their children is a function 
of the child’s contribution to their “future convenience” and “permanent benefit” – sons 
are lavished with attention because they are an asset; a potential source of labour, while 
daughters are ill-treated because they are a liability; they have to be fed, but are 
eventually married off to serve their husbands’ family. If even parents relate to their 
children on the basis of self-interest and not on the basis of mutual love, then Han Fei 
argues, it is absurd to expect rulers, who have no blood ties with the people or the 
ministers, to relate to them on the basis of love. So for Han Fei, the overriding motivation 
of human behaviour, even in the most intimate context of the parent-child relationship, is 
self-interest.  
 Wang and Chang would object to the above description of Han Fei’s theory of 
human nature. In fact, they object to the suggestion that he even had such a fixed theory! 
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According to Wang and Chang, Han Fei does not talk of an invariable and objective 
“human nature.” Ruminating on what constitutes the objective basis of fa, they write: 
[Han Fei is only committed to saying that] for ‘the present age,’ at any rate, the general 
tendency of human nature is toward personal welfare, that is, to be self-interested. He 
then argues that fa is objective to the extent that it is based on the general tendency of 
human nature in a particular historical era. For the ‘present age,’ the critical function of fa 
is to effectively regulate and channel this general tendency of human nature toward 
personal welfare in order to realise the principal goal of good government, namely, public 
interest in an orderly society ... Implicit in Han Fei’s objective relativism, however, is a 
suggestion that human nature is at least somewhat malleable. Different socioeconomic-
political conditions in different historical eras elicited different tendencies of human 
nature. Thus, tendencies of human nature are likely to shift along with changes in history 
and time.14
To substantiate their belief that human nature, is, for Han Fei, “at least somewhat 
malleable,” they refer in a footnote15 to this following passage from “Five Vermin:” 
“Men of remote antiquity strove to be known as moral and virtuous; those of the middle 
age struggled to be known as wise and resourceful; and now men fight for the reputation 
of being vigorous and powerful.”16  
The problem with Wang and Chang’s account is that they confuse human nature 
with its particular expression in different historical conditions. Han Fei’s point in the 
above passage is not that men of remote antiquity were more virtuous than men in “the 
present age,” who have a unique tendency to be self-interested. His point is that people 
                                                 
14 Wang Hsiao-Po and Leo S. Chang, The Philosophical Foundations of Han Fei’s Political Theory, 
University of Hawaii Press, 1986, pp. 49-50. 
15 Ibid. See footnote 18, p. 183. 
16 Liao, vol. 2, p. 279. 
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then strove to be known as moral and virtuous because a reputation for virtue then was 
the means to fame and esteem. He writes earlier in the chapter, “For the same reason, 
men of yore made light of goods, not because they were benevolent, but because goods 
were abundant; while men of today quarrel and pillage, not because they are brutish, but 
because goods are scarce.”17 For Han Fei, then, human nature, from antiquity to the 
present age, has not changed; man has always been and is still self-interested. The 
difference is how this self-interest is expressed in various political, socio-economic 
conditions: In times of yore, when material goods were in abundance, men pursued their 
desire for fame and honour in a benign and non-destructive manner – by making light of 
material goods and gaining a reputation for being virtuous. In the present age, however, 
because of the scarcity of goods, man’s pursuit of self-interest has led to disorder, to 
quarrelling and pillaging. Wang and Chang’s account of Han Fei’s “objective relativism” 
thus needs to be revised. Han Fei’s fa is objective to the extent that it is the normative and 
unchanging principle of good government throughout the ages. Regardless of the age, the 
ruler must establish clear and fixed laws or standards that the people find easy to 
understand and follow. These laws, backed by the promise of reward and the threat of 
sanction, are unambiguous statements of the means to profit and avoid harm. The ruler 
must thereafter entrust all matters of government, from whom to employ to who is 
rewarded and punished, to this plumb line and not decide on the basis of his subjective 
tastes and preferences. Fa, however, is relative insofar as its content is determined by the 
specific circumstances of the age. When resources are plenty and the nation is at peace, 
the ruler may “patronise” or reward Confucian scholars and cavaliers. When the nation is 
in danger and needs to “call upon its fighting men,” the ruler must fix his fa to reward 
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those who risk their lives in battle and to punish severely these same Confucian scholars 
and cavaliers whose teaching now discourages the people from the tasks that are crucial 
to the preservation of the state.18 Implicit in Han Fei’s “objective relativism,” then, is not 
the suggestion that human nature is malleable, but rather, that human behaviour is 
malleable. In fact, that fa is able to determine human behaviour is precisely because 
human nature is, to some extent, fixed; fa’s success is predicated upon the assumption 
that man is by nature profit-loving.    
In sum, contrary to what Wang and Chang believe, Han Fei does have a theory of 
human nature, which states that man is essentially self-interested and profit-minded, and 
makes decisions based on “rational” calculations of his self-interest. For all his 
similarities with Hobbes, I think Han Fei differs from him in one crucial aspect: Hobbes 
saw the rational, self-interested individual as a problem for government, and therefore set 
up laws to restrain the individual’s pursuit of profit. Han Fei, conversely, saw the 
calculating, self-interested individual as a great boon to government. Instead of acting as 
a restraint, his laws encourage and exploit man’s love for profit to ultimately benefit the 
state. Interestingly, a recent article on the United Nations (UN) brings this difference 
between Han Fei and Hobbes into focus: 
The UN and the people who gravitate towards it are products of a late-modern sensibility, 
which views the possibility of good as an open horizon. Thus, there should be no 
impediment to the project of perfecting the world. Yet the idea that the world is 
perfectible is a curious one. Pre-modern and even early-modern politics did not include 
belief in the perfectibility of man or regimes. Laws and social contracts exist to limit 
individual and government actions. This is precisely because man cannot be expected to 
                                                 
18 Han Fei Zi, “The Five Vermin,” Watson, p. 107.  
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be moral. Instead, the late-modern project considers laws as “enabling mechanisms” for 
social good ... Laws are meant to engineer good ends, rather than restrict bad behaviour.19  
Although Han Fei would certainly have rejected the UN’s belief (or so this article 
implies) that man is perfectible, he would have concurred with its belief that regimes, or 
states, are perfectible. While Hobbes and his fellow social contract theorists sought to 
“restrict bad behaviour” with laws, Han Fei, like the UN (preposterous as this comparison 
might seem), saw laws as “enabling mechanisms” for social good and for “perfecting” the 
state. His political model takes into account the imperfections of man and exploits these 
for good – to produce desirable outcomes in the state. In the following section, we will 
look at Han Fei’s blueprint for the perfect state.   
3.2  Han Fei’s blueprint for the perfect state 
 According to Steven Pinker, Hobbes’ conception of the rational, self-interested 
individual became, in the twentieth century, the basis for the rational actor or “economic 
man” models in economics and political science, and for cost-benefit analyses of public 
choices.20 It should come to us as no surprise, then, considering Han Fei’s affinity with 
Hobbes on the topic of human nature, that many scholars regard him, and more generally, 
Legalism, as an anticipation of modern, Western political or “managerial” science. A.C. 
Graham, for example, describes Legalism as “an amoral science of statecraft,”21 while 
Schwartz calls it “the behavioural science.”22   
                                                 
19 Tion Kwa, “The reforms will strengthen the UN’s jurisdiction but endanger individual states’ 
sovereignty,” published in The Straits Times, April 2, 2005. 
20 Pinker, The Blank Slate, op. cit., p. 285. 
21 A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: philosophical argument in ancient China, Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1989.  
22 Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1985. 
 89
I think Legalism can be described as a “science” insofar as its proponents 
believed that political outcomes could be fixed and were not simply random, or the 
product of fate. Unlike the Confucians, for whom success in government depended on the 
chance appearance of a sage-king, the Legalists believed that there was a “fixed formula” 
to achieve order, which even a mediocre ruler could apply with certain results. For 
Schwartz, this “formula” consists in a simple understanding of human behaviour. As long 
as the ruler grasps what Schwartz calls the “true science of human behaviour,”23 which is 
man’s love for profit and hatred of punishment, he can move the entire society in any 
desired direction. Schwartz writes:  
In Legalism, we will have a vision of a society in which “objective” mechanisms of 
“behavioural” control become automatic instruments for achieving well-defined 
sociopolitical goals ... [A] major aspect of Legalism [is] its dynamic goal-oriented nature. 
[Like Tzu-ch’an’s programme, the Legalist programme] is indeed almost “rationalistic” 
in the Weberian sense of instrumental rationalism (Zwecksrationalität). It is a 
“rationalism” designed to devise the means appropriate to the achievement of the goal 
later so clearly defined by Lord Shang: “The enrichment of the state and the 
strengthening of its military capacity.”24
Further on in the chapter, Schwartz reveals what these “‘objective’ mechanisms of 
‘behavioural’ control” are: 
Penal law and rewards do play a central role in this entire program. Since the entire 
program is to be “set in motion” by reliance on the negative and positive incentives of a 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 332. 
24 Ibid., p. 328. 
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universal, objective, and impersonal system of penal laws and rewards, it is this simple 
engine of incentives which will move all human energies in the desired directions.25
It is this “simple behaviourist model of man based primarily on the elemental tropisms of 
pain and pleasure,”26 then, that guarantees the predictability and success of the Legalist 
system. That is why anomalous elements of society such as righteous recluses, who are 
immune to the fear of pain and the attraction of pleasure, are regarded as menaces to the 
system and therefore ordered to be exterminated by Han Fei.27  
Legalism can also be seen as a “science of statecraft” to the extent that its model 
of government moves away from a traditional reliance on man to a reliance on laws and 
objective principles of government. Han Fei criticised the Confucian system because it 
was riddled with too many uncertainties. Its success was contingent upon the chance 
appearance of a sage-king or at least a critical mass of virtuous ministers, and the dubious 
assumption that education and ritual can and will transform enough men to ensure a 
general condition of peace. People in the throes of war and in dire suffering, however, do 
not have the luxury of waiting for fate to intervene or for their fellow men to gradually 
respond to the influence of ritual. The chaos of the Warring States period convinced Han 
Fei that there had to be a better way – order in the empire could not be left to the vagaries 
of fate or human emotion. Han Fei thus drafted a “perfect” system that would be free of 
the uncertainties that plagued the Confucian system. First, this system would be utterly 
predictable because it is based on what is certain about man, and not on what is liable to 
change in man. Second, the success of the system would be guaranteed by its laws and 
not by any particular ruler.  
                                                 
25 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, op. cit., p. 332. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p. 333. 
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 First of all then, Han Fei created a system based on what he believed was 
permanent and unchanging about man – his self-interested nature. The ruler must never 
depend on the people loving him of their own accord, or on them being trustworthy, since 
such emotions and attributes are fleeting and are likely to change with the circumstances. 
In “Precautions within the Palace (备内),” Han Fei paints a very pessimistic picture of 
human relationships. He warns the ruler against trusting anyone, neither his consort nor 
even his sons, because “when those who stand to profit by the ruler’s death are many, he 
is in peril.”28 He writes: 
It is hazardous for the ruler of men to trust others, for he who trusts others will be 
controlled by others. Ministers have no bonds of flesh and blood to tie them to their ruler; 
it is only the force of circumstance which compels them to serve him. Hence those who 
act as ministers never for a moment cease trying to spy into their sovereign’s mind ... If 
the ruler puts too much trust in his son [and consort], then evil ministers will find ways to 
utilise the son [and consort] for the accomplishment of their private schemes.29
It is not simply the ministers, however, who scheme to oust the ruler. Han Fei believes 
that because of the huge profit to be gained by the ruler’s death, “it is quite likely that his 
consort, his concubines, or the son he has designated as heir to his throne will wish for 
his early death.”30 Therefore, in governing the state, the ruler must never depend on 
people being trustworthy.  
Since man is by nature profit-loving, Han Fei exhorts the ruler to govern on the 
basis of the calculating mind and not on the basis of love. In “Six Contrarieties,” he 
observes that sons are generally treated better than daughters, and concludes that even 
                                                 
28 Watson, p. 86. 
29 Watson, p. 84. 
30 Watson, p. 85. 
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parents who have a natural affection for their children ultimately use the calculating mind 
in treating them. Han Fei thus argues: 
[If] even parents in relation to children use the calculating mind in treating them, how 
much more should those who have no affection between parent and child? The learned 
men of to-day, in counselling the lord of men, all persuade him to discard the profit-
seeking mind (求利之心) and follow the way of mutual love. Thereby they demand more 
from the lord of men than from parents. Such is an immature view of human 
relationships:  it is both deceitful and fallacious... If the ruler is not benevolent and the 
ministers are not loyal, hegemony [can]31 be attained.32
Han Fei was vehemently opposed to the “policy of love” which the “learned men of 
today” were promulgating. This policy meant doing away with severe punishments and 
doling out rewards to the poor and starving, regardless of whether they performed any 
meritorious deeds. These “learned men” believed that such measures would in turn cause 
the people to love the ruler and do his bidding. Han Fei condemned such talk as 
“deceitful and fallacious” and based on an utterly “immature” view of human 
relationships. According to Han Fei, a simple example from common experience suffices 
to show that man is essentially profit-seeking, and that relationships, however close, are 
therefore fundamentally based on the calculating mind. He does not deny that a natural 
affection exists between parent and child and that parents might act out of love for their 
children and vice versa. His point, however, is that such love is unreliable because it will 
always play second fiddle to man’s primary love for profit. This explains Han Fei’s 
curious comment that hegemony can only be attained if the ruler is not benevolent and 
                                                 
31 Liao makes an error in translating this as, “... If the ruler is not benevolent and the ministers are not loyal, 
hegemony cannot be attained.” This would contradict what Han Fei has been saying earlier. 
32 Liao, vol. 2, pp. 239-240. 
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the ministers, not loyal. Critics read this as proof that morality has no part to play in Han 
Fei’s political system. I suggest that what this comment really means is that hegemony 
can only be attained if the ruler relies on what is certain about man – his calculating mind 
– and not on what is unpredictable about man – either the people’s love or the ministers’ 
loyalty.  
 Han Fei also wanted to create a system that would function independently of the 
ruler’s genius or virtue. In “The Way to Maintain the State,” Han Fei writes, “The right 
way [to maintain the state] is not to rely on Pi Kan’s martyrdom in the cause of fidelity 
nor to count on rapacious minister’s committing no deception, but to rely on the ability of 
the timid to subdue the tiger and to appropriate the facilities of the average sovereign to 
maintain the state.”33 In this passage, Han Fei highlights two main problems with the 
Confucian system. First, its success depends on the people doing good; on the minister’s 
committing no deception and on his serving the ruler as loyally as Pi Kan. The other 
problem with the Confucian system is that it depends on the ability of the ruler to subdue 
and transform wicked elements in the state. In the Warring States period, however, 
rapacious ministers were rampant and rulers had neither the ability nor the virtue to 
subdue these “tigers.” It was essential for Han Fei, therefore, to invent a system that 
enabled the timid to subdue the tiger, the average sovereign to maintain the state. He 
became convinced that even the mediocre rulers of his day could unify the empire as long 
as they followed objective principles of good government. These were, for Han Fei, the 
three concepts of shi, shu and fa. Since the ruler is fallible, he must entrust the running of 
the state to infallible mechanisms of government. In “On Having Standards,” Han Fei 
writes: 
                                                 
33 Liao, vol. 1, p. 268. 
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A truly enlightened ruler uses the law to select men for him; he does not choose them 
himself. He uses the law to weigh their merits; he does not attempt to judge them for 
himself. Hence men of true worth will not be able to hide their talents, nor spoilers to 
gloss over their faults. Men cannot advance on the basis of praise alone, nor be driven 
from court by calumny. Then there will be a clear understanding of values between the 
ruler and his ministers, and the state can be easily governed. But only if the ruler makes 
use of the law can he hope to achieve this.34
Han Fei goes on to explain why the ruler must defer to the law in all matters of 
government: 
[If] the ruler uses his eyes, his subordinates will try to prettify what he sees; if he uses his 
ears, they will try to embellish what he hears; and if he uses his mind, they will be at him 
with endless speeches. The former kings, knowing that these three faculties would not 
suffice, accordingly set aside their own abilities; instead they relied upon law and policy, 
and took care to see that rewards and punishments were carefully apportioned ... 
[Consequently] Even the cleverest men could find no opening for their falsehoods, the 
glibbest talkers no audience for their sophistries, and evil and deceit were left without a 
foothold.35
Han Fei urges the ruler to set aside his own abilities and rely strictly on the law to make 
decisions in government because the law is blind to those factors that usually impair a 
ruler’s judgement, like flattery and sophistry. A dependence on the law, then, prevents 
the ruler’s own imperfections from sullying the system.  
To sum up, Han Fei drew up a blueprint for the “perfect” state based on his 
understanding of the “science of human behaviour” and his conviction that there is a 
                                                 
34 Watson, p. 24. 
35 Watson, pp. 26-27. 
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reliable method to governing the state; there are objective principles of good government, 
which, if adhered to, will guarantee successful political outcomes. He was convinced that 
his, rather than the Confucian’s, was the better proposal for government since his system 
would be utterly predictable and invulnerable to the caprices of fate and human emotion. 
Achieving order in the empire would thus no longer be a chimera but, instead, a realistic 
target for even the most mediocre of rulers.  
3.2.1 Perfectly ordered relationships  
Han Fei also envisaged perfectly ordered relationships within the state. But 
surely, we object, how is such harmony possible when the entire system encourages man 
to be self-interested and when relationships are all based upon the calculating mind? Han 
Fei argues that it is precisely when each person thinks only for his self-interest that a 
perfectly ordered state, with all the five relationships in perfect harmony, is possible. In 
“Outer Congeries of Sayings, Upper Left Series,” Han Fei quotes the proverbial saying: 
“when one works with the other person in mind, both parties end up blaming each other; 
when one works for himself, the affair proceeds well.”36 Han Fei illustrates this saying by 
pointing out that a son who does not receive good care from his parents in his childhood 
will grow up to resent them. In the same way, when a grown-up son provides scantily for 
his parents, his parents become angry and reprimand him. From this we see that although 
father and son share the most intimate relationship, blame and resentment set in when 
each party expects the other to think for his interests and work for him in mind. Han Fei’s 
point is that such resentment and blame will not occur if relationships are conducted 
purely on the basis of self-interest, that is, if everyone works for himself and not for the 
                                                 
36 张觉, 韩非子全译 (下), 贵州人民出版社, 1990, p. 586. Liao’s translation of this passage, in my 
opinion, does not capture the essence of what Han Fei is saying. See Liao, vol. 2, p. 27. 
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sake of others. This is evident, Han Fei argues, in the master-workman relationship. A 
master would spare no expense to feed his workmen with good food and exchange cash 
and cloth for a valuable currency to pay for their services, not because he loves the hired 
workmen, but because he wants them to “till the land deeper and pick the weed more 
carefully.”37 The hired workmen, too, exert themselves on the fields, not because they 
love their master, but because by so doing, the soup will be delicious and the valuable 
currency will be paid to them. The reason why the master provides for the workmen as 
for his sons, and the workmen exert themselves for their master as for their father; the 
reason “their minds are well-disposed to act for each other,” is because “they cherish self-
seeking motives respectively.”38 Therefore, Han Fei concludes, “When men deal with 
each other in managing affairs and rendering services, if their motive is hope for gain 
(利), then even with a native from Yüeh, it will be easy to remain harmonious. If the 
motive is fear of [harming others], then even father and son will become estranged and 
show resentment toward each other.”39 Contrary to the conventional wisdom which 
attributes the breakdown of relationships to man’s self-interest, Han Fei makes the 
astonishing counter claim that harmonious relationships are only possible when people 
relate solely on the basis of self-interest and profit! In the foregoing passage, we see that 
parents are sometimes slack in providing for their children, probably because love is not a 
constant or strong enough spur. When this happens, resentment and blame set in and 
strain the parent-child relationship. Self-interest, on the other hand, never fails to 
motivate the master to lavish care and concern on his workmen and the latter to toil and 
labour tirelessly for their master. In other words, Han Fei believes that if each man 
                                                 
37 Liao, vol. 2, p. 44. 
38 Liao, vol. 2, p. 45. 
39 Ibid. 
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“works for himself,” he is certain to apply himself strenuously and wholeheartedly to his 
task. This ensures that working relationships are harmonious and the “affair proceeds 
well.” When a man works for the sake of other people, however, he is bound to lose 
interest in his task or slacken off at some point. Such behaviour irks the other party and 
each begins blaming the other, thus causing the relationship to break down.   
 Someone might again object: how can we expect the ruler-subject relationship, in 
particular, to be a harmonious one when the ruler makes no bones about visiting 
extremely severe penalties on the people? Han Fei would probably respond that in his 
“pure meritocracy,” there will be no discontent because each man gets exactly what is 
due to him. This is precisely his argument in the following passage from “Criticism of the 
Ancients, Series Three.” Here, Han Fei criticises Confucius for advising Tzǔ-kao that the 
way to deal with a people with rebellious minds is to “content the near and attract the 
distant.”40 This is a policy aimed at “[encouraging] the people to cherish gratitude to the 
ruler for his favours.”41 Han Fei denounces Confucius’ advice as “state-ruining”42 advice 
because by rewarding men of no merit and absolving criminals of guilt, the ruler in fact 
ends up undermining his own law. This only serves as a further encouragement to the 
people in their rebellion and disregard for the law. The proper way to deal with rebellious 
people, Han Fei argues, is to thwart any large-scale rebellion in its bud by punishing even 
minor infractions of the law.43 So instead of trying to win the hearts of the rebels, the 
ruler must quash any budding rebellion with an iron fist. Han Fei then quotes from the 
Dao De Jing to affirm that his policy will not turn the people against the ruler: 
                                                 
40 Liao, vol. 2, p. 177. 
41 Liao, vol. 2, p. 178. 
42 Liao, vol. 2, p. 177. 
43 Liao, vol. 2, p. 178. 
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Now, if men of merit are always rewarded, the rewarded do not feel grateful to the ruler, 
because the reward is due to their effort. If men guilty of offences are always punished, 
the punished bear no grudge against the authorities, because the punishment is due to 
their misconduct. As the people understand that both punishment and reward are due to 
their own deeds, they will strive to harvest merits and profits in their daily work and will 
not hope for undue gifts from the ruler. “Of the greatest ruler, the people simply know the 
existence.”44 This means that under the greatest ruler the people have no undue joy. Then 
where can be found people bearing gratitude to the ruler? The subjects of the greatest 
ruler receive neither undue profit nor undue injury.45
Han Fei believes that in his pure meritocracy, the people will not harbour any resentment 
towards the ruler in spite of his draconian policies and harsh treatment of them because 
“the people understand that both punishment and reward are due to their own deeds.” In 
fact, Han Fei likens the ruler who strictly metes out punishment and reward to each as he 
deserves according to the law to a great Daoist sage. In Chapter XVII of the Dao De Jing, 
the “best of all rulers” is the one who, “after his task is accomplished and his work done,” 
leaves the people thinking, “it happened to us naturally.”46 That is why “of the greatest 
ruler, the people simply know the existence;” they cannot trace his workings, and yet 
nothing is left undone. It is curious that Han Fei uses this chapter of the Lao Zi to justify 
his heavy-handed suppression of rebellion, since it is quite hard to see how inflicting 
harsh punishment on the people would leave them thinking that order has been restored 
“naturally.” Han Fei, however, interprets Lao Zi to be saying that “the subjects of the 
                                                 
44 I am quoting Liao’s footnote. Lao Tzǔ’s Tao-Teh-Ching, Ch. XVII, I, trans. Carus. 
45 Liao, vol. 2, pp. 178-179. 
46 Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, translated by D. C. Lau, Penguin Books, 1963, p. 21.  
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greatest ruler receive neither undue profit nor undue injury.” Ellen Chen’s following 
remark, I think, helps us to understand Han Fei’s peculiar interpretation of Lao Zi:  
[For Han Fei] The ideal situation obtains when law operates like Nature, impersonally, 
impartially, spontaneously: the ruler in meting out punishments shows no personal 
feelings, the subjects in being punished feel no rancour. Government becomes completely 
impersonal, working out the ponderous law of punishment and reward like karma or 
moira.47
The Legalist ruler is like that “greatest ruler” of whom the people simply know the 
existence because he does not interfere in the workings of the law. He reposes in non-
action and allows the “ponderous law of punishment and reward” to run its course, 
indicting the guilty and rewarding the deserving. Order is thereby gradually restored in 
the state, quite unbeknown to the people, who think, “It happened to us naturally.” The 
people feel no resentment against the ruler even when they are severely punished because 
they understand that they reap exactly what they sow. In fact, because of the completely 
impersonal nature of government, they cannot harbour any personal grudge against the 
ruler, who merely carries out the dictates of the law dutifully.   
 To summarise, Han Fei foresaw that relationships in his ideal state would be 
perfectly ordered since people would relate to one another purely on the basis of profit. 
He believed that man will spare no expense and effort in caring for another party if there 
is some profit to be gained by it. The profit motive thus ensures that people cooperate for 
mutual gain and benefit. On the other hand, relationships conducted on the basis of love 
are likely to turn sour because love, even that between parent and child, cannot be 
sustained. When love falters, blame and resentment set in and relationships break down. 
                                                 
47 Ellen Marie Chen, “The Dialectic of Chih (Reason) and Tao (Nature) in the Han Fei-Tzu, Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy, 1975, p. 9. 
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Han Fei was also convinced that the ruler-subject relationship could be a harmonious one 
in spite of the ruler’s severity because in his pure meritocracy, the people understand that 
they receive only what their deeds deserve.  
3.3 An evaluation of Han Fei’s perfect state 
 We have thus far been studying Han Fei’s vision for good government. Contrary 
to what his critics believe, Han Fei did not set out to write a treatise for despots. Instead, 
he wrote to remedy a dire situation of internal disorder and external turmoil. He drew up 
a blueprint for the perfect system – one whose success would not hinge on the rare virtue 
or ability of exceptional men. This system was designed to enable even mediocre rulers 
to attain the holy grail of unification, and thereby put an end to the incessant warfare of 
the period. From the foregoing sections, it should be quite clear that Han Fei’s system is 
wholly predicated on the fact that man is rationally self-interested. It is not enough to say, 
then, that Han Fei’s theory of government derives from this conception of man. His 
theory of government depends on, and indeed, thrives on the fact that man is by nature 
self-interested. Man’s pursuit of self-interest is the engine that drives the entire system 
towards the goal of unifying the empire. In order for this system to succeed, it demands 
that man be primarily, or better yet, solely motivated by a love for profit and a 
concomitant fear of harm or punishment. Other motivations, such as love and 
compassion, add too much uncertainty to the system since emotions, by their very nature, 
are unpredictable – they tend to be dependent on circumstances and vary in intensity 
across time. As such, these have to be removed from the system so as not to compromise 
its stability and success. The problem for critics of Han Fei, however, is whether a system 
that encourages man’s self-seeking tendencies and deliberately sets out to discourage 
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moral virtues such as altruism and loyalty is, in the end, self-defeating. Is it possible to 
have a society that is based entirely on the self-interested individual? In this concluding 
section, I will attempt to answer this question and also assess the overall tenability of Han 
Fei’s political system.  
3.3.1 Is Han Fei’s system tenable? 
The merits and demerits of government by laws have been debated ad nauseam 
by scholars and there is no need to rehash the debate here.48 Suffice it to say that the main 
problem with laws, as the critics point out, is that they tend to reinforce man’s selfish 
tendencies and weaken the natural associations and bonds that exist between people. John 
Dewey, for example, argues that an increased dependence on the law to regulate social 
interactions weakens the moral bonds implicit in human relationships and transforms 
these into “abstract modes of interaction in which the feelings of shared commitment to 
common goals [are] effectively lost.”49 Let me explain what Dewey is saying with an 
example right out of my neighbourhood. The resident’s committee put up a banner about 
a year ago requesting visitors not to park illegally, as this would obstruct residents from 
entering or exiting their own compounds. Instead of reading, as we might expect, “Don’t 
park illegally because it would inconvenience others,” the banner reads, “Don’t park 
illegally because the police patrol this area frequently.” While invoking the authorities 
and appealing to man’s fear of punishment is, in the short term, admittedly a more 
effective deterrent than a mere appeal to man’s empathy, what Dewey and others fear is 
                                                 
48 Bodde and Morris give a fine summary of the main Legalist and Confucian arguments for and against 
government by laws respectively. See Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, “Confucian Views of Li and Law” 
and “The Legalists and Law,” in Law in Imperial China: exemplified by 190 Ch'ing Dynasty cases, 
translated from the Hsing-an jui-lan, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967, pp. 19-27. 
49 John Dewey, Individualism Old and New, New York: Capricorn Books, p. 53. Quoted by David L. Hall 
and Roger T. Ames in The Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius and the hope for democracy in 
China, Open Court: Chicago, 1999, pp. 136-137. 
 102
that in the long run, laws encourage man to become even more self-centred. A person 
might, in the above example, refrain from parking illegally, but this only to escape a hefty 
fine, and not out of consideration for others. Over time, he begins to think and act 
increasingly in terms of his own self-interest, and his capability to empathise is gradually 
vitiated. So the problem with laws is that they encourage selfishness and ultimately 
undermine the community’s social connectedness.  
  This problem of weakening social bonds is all the more severe in Han Fei’s law-
governed state because his laws systematically discourage moral virtues such as filial 
piety and loyalty, which at least in the Confucian system, serve as the bases for social 
cohesion. But surely, his critics point out, Han Fei’s system is self-defeating because he 
removes from it the very moral constraints needed to hold societies together! It is naive 
for Han Fei to think that self-interest alone guarantees cooperation between two parties, 
for if man’s self-interest were his sole concern, it might well be to his advantage to cheat 
another for personal gain. In his defence, Han Fei could say that there are laws in place to 
prevent such anti-social behaviour. He could argue that law makes morality unnecessary, 
since people can be made to cooperate and live with a semblance of harmony under threat 
of sanction. However, critics retort, if laws are all there are to prevent man from harming 
others in his pursuit of profit, the burden on the law, and on the state to enforce it, 
becomes extremely heavy. As Devlin so eloquently put it, when the community as a 
whole is not “deeply imbued with a sense of sin ... the law sags under a weight which it is 
not constructed to bear and may become permanently warped.”50 In other words, morality 
is necessary in order for law to be effective. If people were not “imbued with a sense of 
                                                 
50 Patrick Devlin, “Morals and the Criminal Law,” in The Enforcement of Morals, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965, p. 24.  
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sin,” and were kept from crime solely by the law, then constant surveillance would be 
necessary to prevent any transgressions. The cost of running such an Orwellian system, 
however, is enormous and well beyond the means of most states.  
Let me suggest another defence for Han Fei against the charge that self-interest 
necessarily undermines society. In his book, “The Great Disruption: human nature and 
the reconstitution of social order,” Francis Fukuyama challenges the commonly held 
belief that modern capitalism, by “[putting] a price on everything and [replacing] human 
relationships with the bottom line,” is “destined to undermine its own moral basis, and 
thereby bring about its own collapse.”51 He argues that there is “little evidence” to 
suggest that men in capitalist societies “will cease to set moral standards for themselves 
and seek to live up to them.”52 On the contrary, just as they have done so in the past, 
human beings will continue to produce moral rules for themselves, “partly because they 
are designed by nature to do so and partly as a result of their pursuit of self-interest.”53 
Fukuyama goes on to quote several Enlightenment thinkers, who argued that capitalism, 
far from undermining morals, actually improved them. Chief amongst these thinkers was 
Samuel Ricard, who, in 1704, said: 
Commerce attaches [men] to one another through mutual utility.... Through commerce, 
man learns to deliberate, to be honest, to acquire manners, to be prudent and reserved in 
both talk and action. Sensing the necessity to be wise and honest in order to succeed, he 
flees vice, or at least his demeanour exhibits decency and seriousness so as not to arouse 
any adverse judgement on the part of present and future acquaintances.54
                                                 
51 Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: human nature and the reconstitution of social order, The Free 
Press, 1999, p. 249. 
52 Ibid., pp. 249-250. 
53 Ibid., p. 250. 
54 Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, op. cit., p. 254. 
 104
Fukuyama thus concludes that “private agents seeking their own selfish ends will tend to 
produce social capital55 and the virtues associated with it, like honesty, reliability, and 
reciprocity.”56 Although he concedes that capitalism is often a destructive force that 
breaks apart traditional loyalties and obligations, he believes that capitalism also creates 
order and builds new norms to replace the ones it destroyed.57
  I think Fukuyama’s argument is instructive for our purposes because it confirms 
Han Fei’s belief that a social order based entirely upon the self-interested individual is 
tenable. In their pursuit of profit, men will produce binding moral rules that make social 
cooperation possible. Amongst the Confucians, especially Mencius, there is a tendency to 
set up morality (仁) and profit (利) as antithetical terms. In Mencius IA1, for example, 
Mencius chastises King Hui of Liang for being preoccupied with “profiting” the state. He 
says, “What is the point of mentioning the word ‘profit’? All that matters is that there 
should be benevolence and rightness (仁义).”58 Fukuyama, on the other hand, sees no 
incompatibility between these two terms. In fact, he believes that man’s pursuit of profit 
will lead him to be moral, or at least, to display those qualities that are essential for social 
cooperation and order. Han Fei seems to hold a similar view to Fukuyama. Hence, in 
spite of his open denunciation of conventional morality, there is some kind of morality at 
work in his system. The notion of xin (信: trustworthiness), for example, is very 
important to Han Fei. In “Outer Congeries of Sayings, Upper Left Series,” he notes the 
saying, “If small faith (xin) is well accomplished, great faith will naturally be established. 
Therefore, the enlightened sovereign accumulates faith. If reward and punishment are of 
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56 Ibid., p. 255. 
57 Ibid., p. 253. 
58 Mencius, trans. D. C. Lau, Penguin books, 1970, p. 49. 
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no faith, then prohibitions and orders cannot prevail.” In his annotations to this saying, 
Han Fei gives the historical example of Duke Wên of Chin, who forsook a military 
advantage in Yüan so as to honour his word to his men. Responding to remonstrations 
from his ministers and attendants to continue hostilities in Yüan, the Duke said, “I set the 
time limit to my men at ten days for the expedition. If I do not leave, I will violate faith 
with my men. Taking Yüan and thereby breaking faith, I cannot bear.”59 Instead of 
condemning Duke Wên for passing up on a sure victory, Han Fei extols him as an 
example that rulers ought to emulate. This reveals the importance of xin to Han Fei’s 
political system. If the ruler is not true to his written word, which is the law, if he lets the 
guilty go unpunished and neglects to reward the deserving, then “prohibitions and orders 
cannot prevail,” and the state will go to ruin. In order to safeguard his own interests and 
to make the law work, then, the ruler must be trustworthy.  
Therefore, we have no reason to doubt the tenability of Han Fei’s system, which, 
like modern capitalism, simultaneously appeals to and reinforces man’s self-interest. Just 
as modern capitalism has successfully created new norms to replace the ones it destroyed, 
we have every reason to expect that Han Fei’s system, too, will produce those moral 
constraints that are essential to hold any society together.   
There is a second reason for doubting that Han Fei’s system is tenable. Critics 
have pointed out that his behaviourist model of the self, upon which his whole blueprint 
for government rests, is too simplistic. Schwartz, for example, writes: 
Whatever one’s attitude to the Confucian belief in the transformation of society through 
the virtue of ethical elites, it is nevertheless a belief which also posits a certain potential 
for moral and intellectual initiative in human beings. It thus, in effect, may be essentially 
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more “realistic” than the simple behaviourist model so clearly enunciated by the 
Legalists. Despite its moralism, or because of it, it is able to take into account the role of 
human sentiment, ingenuity, cunning, and resourcefulness in frustrating and evading all 
institutional devices.60
Schwartz’s point is that “the dream of a Legalist ‘utopia’ completely controlled by 
impersonal mechanisms of law, ‘technique,’ and the mystery of authority – a society in 
which the incalculable forces of private passions, sentiments, values, and convictions will 
have been eliminated,”61 is, in the end, just that – a dream. In his effort to construct a 
perfect system that would run like clockwork, Han Fei disregarded the fact that man is a 
complex being. He reduced man to a mere animal much like the dog in Pavlov’s 
experiment, whose behaviour is altogether conditioned by the use of positive and 
negative reinforcements. As a result, the system he designed cannot cope with man’s 
ingenuity and resourcefulness in circumventing the law. Nor can it cope with man’s 
“private passions, sentiments, values, and convictions,” which extend beyond a mere love 
for profit and fear of harm. As Schwartz asks rhetorically, “Can private sentiments and 
passions ever be ruled out? ... When the mass of men see no relationship between penal 
law and their own life interests will they not, in the end, prove extraordinarily ingenious 
in evading it?62
 In his defence, Han Fei would probably argue that it is only a small minority that 
possesses the ingenuity to evade the law. Government, he would say, is to govern the 
majority and not the rare genius. And most people, besides lacking the cunning to 
circumvent the law, are primarily motivated positively by reward and negatively by 
                                                 
60 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, op. cit., p. 347. 
61 Ibid., p. 349. 
62 Ibid., p. 347. 
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punishment, however unfortunate the comparison with the Pavlovian dog might seem. In 
“Loyalty and Filial Piety: A Memorial,” Han Fei responds to critics who object to his 
policy of encouraging the people with rewards and terrifying them with punishments. He 
writes: 
[People] of this age all say: “As Hsü Yu declined the rule over All-under-Heaven, mere 
reward would not be sufficient to encourage worthies. As Robber Chê purposely 
transgressed the penal law and bravely underwent the consequent disaster, punishment 
would not be sufficient to prevent culprits.” In response thy servant would say: “... The 
two persons were extremes. The right way of governing the state and employing the 
people should not take these rare persons as standards. For government is to govern the 
ordinary persons; its true path is to lead the ordinary persons; wherefore extreme things 
and eccentric words are detrimental to political order. The highest man of the world 
cannot be encouraged with reward; nor can the lowest man of the world be restrained by 
penalty. However, if on account of the highest man reward is not established, and on 
account of the lowest man punishment is not established, the right way of governing the 
state and employing the people will be missed.”63
The reason why Han Fei sticks to a simple, behaviourist model of the self, then, is 
because he believes that this model accounts for the majority of mankind. Even if we 
concede that human beings are complex creatures who cannot be characterised solely in 
terms of their love for profit and a corresponding fear of harm, we must admit that these 
are two of the strongest human motivations. Most people are terrified by severe penalties 
and are encouraged by generous rewards. In Han Fei’s state, where the ruler wields 
exclusive control over the means to profit and avoid harm, it is quite likely that most 
people would put aside their private convictions and passions, and seek safety with the 
                                                 
63 Liao, vol. 2, p. 317. 
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ruler. This is even more likely given the fact that Han Fei’s ruler is not a ruthless and 
cruel tyrant who oppresses the people and uses them as mere tools to achieve his private 
ambitions. As we established in Chapter Two, Han Fei’s ruler works ultimately for the 
benefit of the people, to rescue them from the throes of war and suffering. In fact, 
contrary to what Schwartz thinks, Han Fei expects the people to see “a relationship 
between penal law and their own life interests.” In “How to Use Men,” Han Fei writes: 
The intelligent sovereign offers rewards that may be earned and establishes punishments 
that [can]64 be avoided. Accordingly, worthies are encouraged by rewards and never meet 
Tzǔ-hsü’s disaster; unworthy people commit few crimes and never see the humpback 
being cut open; blind people walk on the plain and never come across any deep ravine; 
stupid people keep silent and never fall into hazards. Should such be the case, the 
affection between superior and inferior will be well founded [上下之恩结].65
The only way for any affection to exist between superior and inferior in such a harsh 
system is if the people “rationally” agree to be subject to it. In other words, the people 
willingly submit to the ruler because they understand that his harsh laws are drafted in 
their best interests; to prevent them from falling into a “deep ravine” or any harm.  
In summary, to those critics who accuse him of relying on an over-simplistic 
model of man, Han Fei’s reply is that this model accounts for most “ordinary persons.” 
He concedes that his system cannot cope with “eccentricities” or anomalous elements in 
society, like high-minded scholars and hardened criminals, who cannot be motivated by 
either reward or punishment. However, government must be designed to “lead the 
ordinary persons,” and not the “extremes” in society.  
                                                 
64 I think this is a better translation for “可避之罚”, which Liao translates as, “punishments that [should] be 
avoided.”  
65 Liao, vol. 1, pp. 270-271. 
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 There is a third reason to doubt the tenability of Han Fei’s system, which, I think, 
is potentially more damaging than the ones we have considered. While scholars have 
criticised Han Fei for underestimating man and his complexity, I think that Han Fei’s 
fatal mistake is in overestimating the capability of a mediocre ruler to head his system. 
First, the Machiavellian cunning and deceit that Han Fei expects of his ruler seems to me 
to be beyond the capability of the average person. Han Fei’s ruler is required to master a 
whole repertoire of techniques to control his ministers. He must, for instance, “invert his 
words” and “use contradictory arguments” to trick them into revealing their secret plots. 
He must also be able to perceive the ministers’ hidden intentions from their reactions and 
facial expressions.66 The ruler must furthermore discard all emotion so that no one can 
know his thoughts and use this knowledge to manipulate him. He must also be absolutely 
impartial and not treat even his sons and consort preferentially; otherwise, evil ministers 
will make use of them to influence him. Such impartiality and clever wile are the 
preserve of a handful and clearly are not typical of the average man. If it turns out that the 
wily Legalist ruler is as rare as the virtuous Confucian sage-king, however, then Han 
Fei’s claim that his form of government is more reliable than the Confucian system for 
restoring order is thoroughly debunked.  
  Second, although it is quite clear from the preceding chapters that Han Fei never 
meant for his ruler to be a tyrannical despot, but instead, imagined him to be a benevolent 
ruler who is genuinely committed to the people’s welfare, it is not at all clear how Han 
Fei could expect so much from any ruler given his theory of human nature. If even 
parents seek ultimately to profit from their children, how can Han Fei expect the ruler, 
who has no blood ties with the people, to put the people’s welfare first or to li min? 
                                                 
66 See section 2.2.4, “Machiavellian deceit to control ministers,” pp. 57-65. See in particular pp. 58-59. 
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Someone might try to defend Han Fei by arguing that he does not in fact expect 
such altruism from the ruler. It is Han Fei himself who is personally committed to li min 
and makes this the basis of his entire Legalist programme. Han Fei is not being 
inconsistent because his theory of human nature only commits him to saying that most or 
practically all men are profit-minded; it does not preclude exceptions like Han Fei 
himself, who risked life and limb to persuade rulers to act on his proposal for government 
change. Such a defence would continue, a mediocre ruler, who is self-interested and 
profit-minded, can and will implement Han Fei’s political programme because it would 
be in his own interests to benefit the people; with unification, the ruler would have all the 
resources of the empire at his disposal.  
 The problem with this defence is that while it is conceivable that the ruler’s 
immediate interests coincided with those of the people – the unification of the empire was 
key to securing benefit for the people and the ruler alike, it is not clear that for Han Fei, 
their interests were always co-extensive. This is unlike in The Art of Rulership, where 
according to Ames, in order to reinforce the strength and stability of the government, the 
ruler “finds himself in the position of having to accommodate his government to the 
inclinations of the people and of being governed himself by what the people in general 
find agreeable.”67 Han Fei, on the other hand, put great store in the notion of shi (power 
or authority) and did not see popular support as at all necessary for the viability of the 
state. A self-interested ruler would thus not seek to benefit the people when his interests 
are at cross purposes with theirs.    
Furthermore, to argue that for Han Fei, li min is a means to achieve the ruler’s 
paramount self-interest would be to disregard all the passages in the Han Fei Zi which 
                                                 
67 Roger Ames, The Art of Rulership, University of Hawaii Press, 1983, p. 154. 
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insist that the ultimate goal of government is to benefit the people. As we saw earlier in 
Chapter Two, Han Fei labours to justify his draconian measures in terms of the benefit 
they bring to the people, not to the ruler. There seems little reason, then, to believe that 
Han Fei considered li min as a means to achieving benefit for the ruler, and not an end.   
If Han Fei’s political system does not require popular support to be viable, and if 
man were truly self-interested to the extent that Han Fei believes he is, then when it no 
longer serves the ruler’s interests to benefit the people, he would surely cast aside their 
benefit to pursue his own gain. And there is nothing within Han Fei’s system to prevent 
the ruler from using his inordinate powers to pursue his private gain at the people’s 
expense. We learnt from the previous chapters that Han Fei accords the ruler extensive 
powers over the people. On top of having full autonomy to create the law, the ruler is also 
given exclusive control over the system of reward and punishment that enforces the law. 
In contemporary terms, Han Fei’s ruler has full control over both the legislative and 
executive arms of government. There are no checks and balances on the ruler within this 
system because Han Fei believed that if the ruler were to share power with his ministers, 
he would end up being controlled by them. Once the ruler’s power (shi) is undermined, 
he would lose all ability to lead the people, and the state would go to ruin. By not 
imposing a system of controls on the ruler that would keep him accountable for his use of 
power, Han Fei did not rule out the possibility that a ruler might, one day, abuse the 
system, and turn out to be that very despot that Han Fei so dreads. To quote James 
Madison again, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were 
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be 
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necessary.”68 Precisely because rulers, like all men, are not angels, Han Fei had to create 
a system of checks and balances that would make it impossible for rulers to become 
despots.  
If we accept Chapter Two’s thesis that Han Fei is genuinely committed to li min, 
then the only way to explain the lack of checks and balances within his system is that he 
failed to apply his theory of human nature to the ruler. Han Fei’s fatal mistake – one that, 
I think, compromises his entire political system – is that he did not carry his theory of 
human nature to its logical end to include the ruler. He overlooked the fact that rulers, 
like all men, are self-interested and profit-minded. Consequently, he neglected to put in 
place an accountability system that would guarantee the integrity of his system and 
ensure that it achieves the goal he intended for it to, which is ultimately, to benefit the 
people.   
3.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter has been a presentation and assessment of Han Fei’s contribution to 
the debate on good government. Han Fei was convinced that the way of love which the 
Confucians promulgated was no cure for the prevailing disorder. Furthermore, the 
Confucian system depended on too many variables – on the rare appearance of a sage-
king, and the people reciprocating the ruler’s love. A better and more predictable way to 
restore order was needed. Han Fei saw that man’s profit-loving nature was the one 
constant that could serve as the linchpin of his entire political system. He thus designed a 
system that exploits man’s love of profit to move the state towards its desired goals. 
Unlike the Confucian system, Han Fei’s “scientifically-designed” system would be 
invulnerable to the caprices of fate or human emotion. It would run on laws and objective 
                                                 
68 Federalist Papers No. 51, Rossiter, 1961, p. 322. Quoted by Pinker in The Blank Slate, op. cit., p. 297.  
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principles of government, which even the average rulers of his day could implement with 
success. Han Fei imagined that relationships in the state would be perfectly ordered since 
these would be conducted purely on the basis of self-interest. Even the ruler-subject 
relationship, which we expect to be hostile because of the ruler’s severity, would be 
harmonious since the people understand that in a pure meritocracy, they are rewarded or 
punished exactly as their deeds deserve. Once order has been restored internally, the ruler 
can then set about to unify the empire. We concluded this chapter by assessing the 
tenability of Han Fei’s political system. While it is possible to conceive of a society based 
entirely on the self-interested individual and to also defend Han Fei against the charge 
that his account of the self is too simplistic, I argued that there remains a flaw in his 
system that threatens to completely undermine it. This is his unquestioning belief that the 





 Let me conclude by briefly summarising the main argument as it unfolds in the 
three chapters. In the first two chapters, we set out to answer the question: Is Han Fei 
advocating a complete break between law and morality in a bid to secure absolute power 
for the ruler? In the first chapter, we tried to answer the question by exploring the Daoist 
influence on Han Fei. We thought that if we could show him to be a genuine adherent of 
the Dao and so a natural law theorist on Peerenboom’s account, we would have proven a 
necessary connection between law and morality in his political thought. Han Fei cannot 
then be said to be an advocate of despotism, since, contrary to what his critics claim, his 
ruler does not have unlimited power to create the law. Contrarily, the ruler’s fa is 
informed by the Dao and therefore also constrained by it. Unfortunately, by the end of 
the first chapter, we concluded that both the positivist and natural law readings of the 
Han Fei Zi are equally plausible. Furthermore, we realised that even if we could prove 
that Han Fei is a genuine Daoist, we would be none the wiser as to how law and morality 
are related in his thought, since some have labelled Daoism an ‘amoral’ philosophy.  
  In Chapter Two, we changed tack and sought to answer our initial question by 
studying the raison d’être of government for Han Fei. A close reading of the Han Fei Zi 
revealed that Han Fei does not espouse “government for the ruler,” but instead, 
“government for the people.” I argued that in spite of his condemnation of Confucians, 
Han Fei shares their fundamental belief that the primary task of government is to care for 
the welfare of the people or li min (to benefit the people). We also considered those 
aspects of Han Fei’s philosophy that lend weight to the traditional account of him as a 
defender of despots. These include his recommendation of severe penalties for even small 
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crimes, his use of deceit to control ministers and his removal of political dissidents. We 
saw that these apparently despotic measures are, in fact, justified in terms of the benefit 
they bring to the people. As such, they are altogether compatible with a genuine 
commitment to li min.   
 In the third chapter, we studied Han Fei’s overall blueprint for government, 
beginning with his account of man, to understand why he regards his as the best 
government for a critical age. Han Fei was convinced that human nature is bad, and 
furthermore, that it is incapable of good. As such, the Confucian attempt to transform 
man’s profit-loving nature through education and ritual was doomed to fail. What Han 
Fei proposed instead was to exploit this immutable fact about man, his “badness,” for 
good – to perfect the state and benefit the people. What was a bane to all governments – 
man’s insatiable appetite for profit – Han Fei saw as a great boon to his system. If the 
people could be made to see that the only means to profit lies with the ruler, then they 
would surely seek to profit by conforming to his fa. In this way, the ruler can channel the 
people’s love for profit towards the realisation of state goals.   
Han Fei was also convinced that good government cannot wait for the rare 
appearance of men of exceptional virtue or ability. He wanted, instead, a “fixed formula” 
to achieve good government, which any ruler, however mediocre, could grasp and put 
into effect. In this regard, he can be seen as one of the earliest political scientists. His 
system would not only exploit the “science of human behaviour” – man’s love for profit 
and corresponding fear of harm – but would also run on laws and objective principles of 
government. 
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Han Fei believed that his was the best government for his times because on top of 
being the most effective means to restore order in the empire, his system is also desirable 
to the extent that all the five relationships are in perfect harmony. Han Fei argued that a 
social order based entirely on the self-interested individual is not only viable, but also, 
extremely reliable because self-interest alone guarantees cooperation amongst people. 
Even the ruler-subject relationship, which we expect to be strained because of the ruler’s 
severity, is a harmonious one as the people understand that in a meritocracy, they are 
rewarded or punished according to their deeds.   
I concluded the chapter with an assessment of whether such a perfect system is 
ultimately tenable. There, I argued that the one fatal flaw in Han Fei’s system is his 
failure to put in place institutional checks on the ruler, which would have prevented the 
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